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ABSTRACT

The objective of the study is to examine finns characteristics associated with
aggregate financial disclosure practiees of listed Indian manufacturing and trading

companies for the financial year 1999-2000. Eight research hypothesis were
developed. lt is hypothesised that finn size, size of the audit finn, leverage,
multinational company influence, and capital increase will be positively associated
with disclosure of financial information by Indian compani\ls, while ownership

diffusion, liquidity and profitability will have no association with disclosure of
financial information by Indian companies. Two types of disclosure indexes
(weighted and the unweighted index) were constructed for measuring disclosure.
Weights were assigned to the index based on the perception of financial analysts. A
multiple linear regression analysis was conducted on the sample of 55 Indian
companies using two models (Model 1 for unweighted index and Model 2 for
weighted index). It was found that disclosure is positively associated with firm size,
ownership diffusion, profitability and marginally with capital increase. All the othm'
variables were found to have no effect on disclosure. In this study it was expected
that the use of weights would improve the explanatory power of the models.
However, no differenct:s were noted between the results from weighted and
unweighted disclosure index. Both Model 1 anrl Model 2 had indicated similar
results.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Statement of the problem

In today's complex economic environment, disclosure of financial information is

critical for the allocation of economic resources. Throughout the world, accounting
bodies of developed and developing countries are formulating and implementing
accounting policies a.id practices for fair presentation of financial information in

investment decision-making processes. Globalisation has led companies to broadly
disclose financial information for retaining and gaining investor confidence.
India is a rapidly developing country and globalisation has affected the Indian stock
market extensively. In 1991, The Government of India introduced economic
liberalisation policies to keep in pace with globalisation. During the last decade,
these liberalisation policies have created a favourable climate for the companies to
operate competitively in a market free from controls and regulations (Joshi &
Abdulla, 1995, p. 106). Along with these developments, the stake of the investors
has also increased because of a free and risky market. Due to the current nature cf
the market, investors are becoming more conscious to know the financial position of
the enterprise for decision~making purposes, For rising investor demands and also
due to the changes in the economy, financial reporting by companies in India needs
to be more innovative, multipurpose and user friendly, Consequently, the role of the
accounting profession in India is also becoming more complex to keep pace with
the changing economy.

Many countries have their own sets of rules and regulations for accounting and
financial reporting. Initially, based on the British accounting system, the established
accounting principles in India comprises of the Companies Act (1956), the
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 and the accounting standards laid down
by the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) set up by The Institute of Chartered

Accounta.'*lts oflndia (ICAI).

1

The Companies A~t (1956) and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. are
laid down by the Government of India. They are legally enforceable from the date
of their initiation. Whereas ICAI is a private institution comprising of a group of
professional chartered accountants.
The accounting standards laid down by ASB were not !ega!ly enforceable till 2000.
ASB issued 15 accounting standards before 2000. After 2000, The Companies Act,
1956, gave legal recognition to some of these standards. 1
After liberalisation of the economy, the Accounting Standards (AS) issued by ICAI
have assumed greater importance, firstly, because of the opening up of the economy
and expectations of the international business community and secondly, because of
the greater expectations from the Indian society for reliable, credible and transparent
financial statements.

ICAI have bocn using its best ~ndeavours to persuade

government, appropriate authorities and industrial and busii1ess cmr.munities to
adopt the accounting standards in order to achieve unifonnity in the presentation of
financial statements ':.rid also better disclosures. Research confinns that even before
liberalisation, Indian companies made commendable improvements in their
disclosure practices. Marston and Robson (1997, p. 134) found that disclosure by
Indian companies have improved over the period t 982w83 to I 989w90. The reasc,ns
for improved disclosure included increased compliance with accounting standards
and an increase in the disclosures required the by accounting standards. While in
contrast Joshi and Abdulla, (1995, p. 119) noted that companies follow strict legal
requirements in the disclosure and preparation of financial statements.2

I

The Companies Act. 1956 gave legal recognition to those accounting standards that affect the profit
and los.~ account and balance sheet only.
2

It is to be noted here that legal n:quirements exclude the accounting standards issued by ASB. They
were not legal requirements at the time or the study by Joshi and Abdulla (1995).

2

In a more recent study by Gupta, Saxena & Kaushik (2002), it was found that
although Indian companies try to present their financial statements according to the
accounting standards issued by ICAI, the companies are not properly following the
accounting standards due to lack of legal pressure and auditors awareness of their
duties.

Under the given situation it can he presumed that a study on Indian company
disclosure practices and their association with finn characteristics could be
interesting. Firstly, due to liberalisation, the economy has changed during the last
decade resulting in increased investor demands for reliable and credible information
by companie:... Consequently, the companies need to adopt policies to disclose
broadly to retain investor's confidence. Secondly, the amendment of the Companfos
Act, I 956, that gives legal status to accounting standards issued by ICAI, is an
indication that accounting standards are necessary for broader and appropriate
disclosures by companies, particularly in India, because past research confirms that
companies tend 10 follow legal requirements only. Thus, increased disclosure is the
current requirements by companies from both the perspectives Gf the investors and
re!,'lllators. Both the grOlips would be interested to know which firms disclose more
than others in order to make informed decisions for the former and evaluate
t'C!,'lllations for the later. If certain firm characteristics are associated with disclosure
by companies then a possible answer to the question which finns disclose more than
others, can be given.

As mentioned before, after liberalisation lndian investors have become more
conscious and demanded more infonnation. However, in a study by Joshi &
Abdulla (1994), it was noted that although corporate annual report is the most
important source of infonnation, they are hardly read by Indian investors. The more
predominant method is by word of mouth. Among the number of ways in which
information can be passed on to investors (including the corporate annual reports
and other management reports, prospectus and media), this method is more popular.
It is also called the infonnal method. The informal method means information

passed on by the word of mouth by one investor to another or by a stockbroker to an
investor.

3

Joshi & Abdulla (1994) investigated the infonnation requirements of Indian private
investors in annual reports. Their findings revealed that Indian investors have a
wide range of infonnation requirements depending on their level of sophistication to
interpret information from the annual reports. It would be expected that more
sophisticated investors would rely more on annual reports while others would
depend on word of mouth.

However, information is not free and those that have significant connections in the
finn have more information and those that don't loses out. As mentioned by Singhvi
(1968), obtaining information, even through personal contacts, is very difficult in
India due to the lack of cooperation from the corporate management.

In summary, it can be deduced that Indian investors are classified into several
different classes so increased disclosure through more regulations may and may not
be of much benefit to the investors, because not all of them have Llie ability to
interpret information through annual reports. However, sophisticated investors
(investors who have the expertise and knowledge to interpret infonnation from
annual reports) will benefit from more disclosures through regulations. Change in
the economy after liberalisation has definitely led companies to rethink their
disclosure policies as well as investors to rethink their investment plans. Thus, it is
important for both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors to recognise which
companies disclose more than others.
The study will examine the disclosure of Indian non-financial companies 3 and their
association with eight definite finn characteristics for the period 1999-2000. The
motivation and significance of the study is described in section 1.2.

l Financial companic.~ have their own set of rules and regulations and including them would lead to
ambiguous results.

4

1.2·

Motivation of the study

In this era of globalisation, when the investors are crossing geographical
boundaries, every enterprise wants to keep in pace with every other. Investors are
more aware to know the financial position of the enterprise for decision-making
purposes. Financial disclosuF~ in the financial markets is becoming increasingly
important. This study is motivated from the prior research on disclosure by Indian
companies. Prior research indicated that Indian companies stick to the minimum
level of disclosure required by law (Joshi & Abdulla, 1995). Prior research aJso
indicated that although accounting standards did not have the support of law, they
were gaining importance after t'lf' liberalisation policies of 1991 (Marston &
Robson, l 997). The motivation of •1.e study is to ascertain the impact of
liberalisation of the economy and legal recognition of the accounting st&ndards
issued by ICAI, on the disclosures by Indian companies. In essence it examines the
characteristics of finns that disclose more than others. As mentioned earlier, India
being a fast growing econom!', such a study is essential for the investors and the
regulators.

Wallace and Naser (l 995) argued that knowledge of the relationships among the
level of disclosure and characteristics of reporting finns might be of use to
regulators. They suggest two incentives for regulation. First, market forces may lead
to inefficient resource allocation. Second, market forces may iead to economic
solutions which are undesirable and therefore regulators should be cautious in
imposing additional costs to firms, potentially putting the firm at a relative
economic disadvantage.
Regulators need to detennine finn characteristics of those companies that disclose
more than others, so that they can impose regulations that are beneficial for all films
and not too costly for some firms. For investors it is equally important to know the
finn characteristics that strongly affect the disclosure practices by companies for
investment decision-making purposes. The significance and contnbution of the
study is discussed in section 1.3.

5

1.3

Significance and contribution of the study

Efficiency through competition is the main proposition of today's open economic
system of India. With recent globalisation of trade and industry, it is essential for
companies to make appropriate disclosures to remain in the market However, in
reality Indian stock market is not transparent and the Indian investors remain poorly
infonned and are guided by rumours. The study is important because it will examine
the chc.racteristics of those Indian Gnns that have high levels of aggregate disclosure
and those that don't have high levels of aggregate disclosure. This will extend our
understanding of the nature of finns that disclose most post liberalisation and also
after the approaching mandate of the accounting standards by Companies Act 195f.

The study can guide the regulatory authorities in India to introduce further
regulations or promote voluntary disclosure. Wallace & Naser (1995) have
supported the above, where they argued that in an inefficient market additional
regulations can put firms into economic disadvantage. Thus, regulators should be
very cautious in imposing additional regulations. In addition, this study will add to
the body of knowledge on disclosure practices of Indian companies. The
organisation of the study is outlined in section 1.4.

1.4

Organisation of the study

The study is organised in the following manner. Chapter 2 deals with the literature
review where prior research on Indian company disclosure is analysed. Chapter 3
deals with the theoretical framework and hypothi;sis development that has been
used in the study. Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology of the study and
chapter 5 deals with sample selection and data analysis of the study. Limitations and
future research in outlined in Chapter 6 followed by the references.
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CHAPTER2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Introduction

Disclosure studies on 1ndia are relatively sparse compared to a number of other

developed and developing countries. Besides, several factors are to be kept in mind
before developing literature for the study. For example the purpose of the study

needs to be considered for developine the literature. The purpose of this study is to
measure the association between finn characteristics and disclosure practices of
Indian companies. It was thought that in order to develop a constructive literature
related to the purpose of the study, the legal (section 2.1.1) and the professional

environment of India (section 2. 1.2) needs to be reviewed. The significance of this
section is to trace the development of the legal and professional environment over
the years and till the time of the study so that the contributions of the legal and the
professional environment towards disclosure by Indian companies (section 2.1.3)
can be ascertained. Secondly, the limited number of studies on the Indian
subcontinent has been examined thoroughly. Keeping in mind that this study is
another sequence to the past studies on Indian company disclosures, this section
tries to cover every aspect of the past studies (section 2.5, "Studies of India".).
These studies include the studie,; of Singhvi & Desai (1968), Joshi & Abdulla,

(1994, 1995), Marston and Robson (1997) and Gupta, Saxena & Kaushik (2002).

Prior research on other developed and developing countries, that have led to the
development of this study have also been reviewed (section 2.4). In other words,
studies that deal with firm characteristics and their association with disclosure have
been reviewed. This section enables a clear understanding of the importance of
disclosure studies from the point of view of several researchers throughout the
world.

7

In order to measure aggregate disclosure, a section has been dedicated to examining
the different measures of disclosure and different types of indexes used in prior
studies {section 2.2). Mandatory, voluntary and aggregate disclosures have been
examined in section 2.2.3. The theories {capital raising and costly contracting) used
to explain by several researchers as to why some companies disclose more than
others, has been discussed in the section 2.3.

2.1.1

The legal environment

Studies of Joshi & Abdulla, (1994, 1995) and Marston and Robson (1997) include
reviews of the Indian accounting system and also the legal and professional
regulations that govern Indian companies. The main motivation behind reviewing
regulations by researchers is to ascertain the compliance of mandatory disclosures
by Indian companies in their annual reports as well as examine the effectiveness of
regulations in increasing the levels of aggregate disclosures by companies. Another
motivation is to ascertain the amount of voluntary disclosures by companies, if any.
For the literature review of this study, a review of regulations existing during 19992000 and also the review of the accounting profession of India during 1999-2000
are essential prior to a discussion on disclosure by companies.

Accounting professions throughout the world promote the view that accounting
reports, when prepared according to guidelines will faithfully represent the
underlying transactions and events of the reporting entity. Companies in India are
guided by the Companies Act ( 1956). The primary accounting requirement of the
Companies Act is that the accounts should give a ''true and fair" view {Section 211).
Indian company regulation is controlled by the Company Law Board {Section IOEI OF), rather than directly in the hands of judiciary. It controls the enforcement of the
Companies Act and can exercise additional powers granted by the Central
Government. The Companies Act (1956) was originally based on the British model
because India was a colony of Britain for almost 300 years. The Act was first
amended in 1960 to reflect local requirements. It was then subsequently amended
several times(l965, 1969, 1974, and 1999).
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The Companies Act (1956), its various schedules and its attached prescribed fonns
(the Companies [Central Government's] General Rules and Fonns, 1956) require
various disclosures from companies reporting under the Act. For instance, section
209-233 8 of the Companies Act, 1956 gives statutory gu'idelines in connection
with the accounts and audit of the companies. The statutory reports that are to be
prepared under Companies Act (1956) include the balance sheet, profit and loss
account, directors' report, auditor's report, notes to accounts and disclosure of
accounting policies. If the Central government needs more infonnation from
companies then H can demand more information by publishing a notice in the
Official Gazette (Section 615 of the Companies Ac~ 1956).

The other regulatory authority is the stock exchange. The Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 makes it obligatory on the part of the company to
periodically publish interim reports. This i::, a condition for listing with the stock
exchange. No other form of disclosures is required under this Act.

Hence, a number of regulations are imposed on the Indian companies. However, the
effectiveness of regulations for increased aggregate disclosure by Indian companies
has been discussed later in the literature review (section 2.1.3).

2.1.2

The accounting profession

In India, the professional accounting body is The Institute of Chartered Accountants
of India (ICAI). The Chartered Accountants Act of 1949, lays down the details of
the work of !CAI, its constitution, admission and professional disciplinary
procedures. The Accounting Standard Board (ASB) was set was up by ICAI in 1977
and the first standard was issued in I 979. The members of ASB are primarily
professional chartered accountants. In addition, one chartered accountant from each
of the offices of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the Central Board of
Direct Taxes and the Company Law affairs are represented on the Board (Joshi &
Abdulla, 1995, p. I 07).
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The process of standard setting has been based on the standard setting processes of
the US and UK and other developed countries. Indian accounting standards are
documents produced by ASB and subsequently approved by the council of The
ICAI. The ASB's policy is to talce international accounting standards (IAS) into
consideration in developing its standards. Most of the standards issued by ASB
conform to a11 material aspects of IAS. Joshi & Abdulla, (1995, p. 107) noted that
the main objective behind these accounting standards is to lay down sound
accounting policies to ensure proper accounting in order to improve comparability
of financial statements.

During 1999-2000, 15 accounting standards were operational. A preface to the
standards describes the procedure of implementing the standards. Prior to 19992000, out of the 15 standards, 14 standards were mandatory as per The Chartered
Accountants Act of 1949. However, they were not legally enforceable as per the
Companies Act, 1956. From April l, 2000, some standards issued by ICAI are

described mandatory by The Companies Act (1956), [section 211 (3C)].
As noted by Marston & Robson ( 1997, p. 118) the nature of the accounting
profession in a country feeds back into the type of accounting that is practiced.
Where the accounting profession is strong it is likely to be involved in development
and promulgation of accounting standards. In India, the role of chartered
accountants has changed immensely since its independence and ICAI has gained
importance in the recent years with the liberalisation policies of the government.
However, chartered accountancy is still based on small firms of accountants
although the "Big 5" international accounting finns do have a presence.

The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, lays down the duties of the auditor relating
to the audit of companies. As per Section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956, Indian
accountants are restricted to not more than 20 audit clients per qualified chartered
accountant in their practice.

JO

Table I, "List of Indian Accounting Standards", is a comprehensive list of
accounting standards that were operational prior to the year 1999-2000. The table
also indicates when the accounting standards first crone into force and when it was
declared mandatory by ICAI. It is to be noted here that these accounting standards
were not considered mandatory as per the Companies Act, 1956 till 1999-2000,
after which some of them enjoyed legal enforcement (refer to footnote 1).

2.1.3

Effectiveness of regulations and accounting profession in aggregate
disclosure by Indian companies.

The main purpose of external financial reporting is to meet the inultiple information
requirements of the investors and creditors (Joshi & Abdulla, 1994, p. 7). The
amendments brought into the Companies Act, 1956 and the accounting standards
issued by ICAI are designed to meet the needs of the several user groups and to
reflect local requirements, For instance, the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1988
(section 219) brought about a change in the corporate financial reporting in India.
As per this amendment, a company listed with the stock exchange could send its
shareholders abridged accounts. This change was made on the basis that Indian
investors rely heavily on their instinct and friendly tips and general market
behaviour of share prices rather than extract infonnation from the annual reports
(Joshi & Abdulla, 1995, p. 112). Another reason that is usually cited is the huge cost
in the publication of detailed annual reports (Joshi & Abdulla, 1994, p. 7). The
abridged financial statements represent minimum disclosure by companies.
However, if the companies want, they can disclose detailed information. Joshi &
Abdulla (1994, p. 12) noted that abridged furrn of reporting needs to be
reconsidered. The information disclosed has been reduced considerably and
therefore, this kind of annual report appears to be of reduced importance to
investors. High perfonning companies, which once adopted a more or less full
disclosure policy, have now, curtailed a range ofinfonnation they revealed earlier.
Joshi & Abdulla (1995, p. 12) suggested that companies should be required to
prepare comprehensive reports to more fully respond to diverse investors and other
users' needs. The overall implication is that regulations have caused Indian
companies to have weak incentives to disclose over and above that required by the
Companies Act, 1956.
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Table I
List of Indian accounting standards
Accounting
standard no.

Description

Implementation
year
(Advisory)

Dates from which it
became mandatory
(!CAI)

AS 1

Disclosure ofaccountingpolicies

[979

1993

AS 2

Valuation of inventories

1981

1999

AS 3

Cash flow statements (previously
called "changes in financial
position"

1981

200[

AS 4

Contingencies
and
events
occurring after the balance sheet
date

1982

[995

AS 5

Prior period and extraordinary
items and changes in accounting
policies

1982

[996

AS 6

Depreciation accounting

1982

1995

AS 7

Accounting for construction costs

1983

1993

AS 8

Accounting for
development

[985

1993

AS9

Revenue recognition

1985

1993

AS 10

Accounting for fixed assets

1985

1993

AS II

Accounting for changes in foreign
exchange rates

1989

1995

AS 12

Accounting
for
government
grants
(previously
called
'accounting for capital based
grants' implemented in 1981)

1992

1994

AS 13

Accounting for investments

1995

1995

AS 14

Accounting for amalgamation

1983

1995

AS 15

Accounting
for
retirement
benefits
in
the
financial
statements of the employees.

1995

1995

(AS)

research and
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A review of the Indian accounting standards by Joshi & Abdulla (1995) revealed
that Indian accounting standards have many alternative choices and financial
statements prepared under different accounting alternatives are less comparable.
Joshi and Abdu11a (1995) also noted that the ASB lack representatives from all
categories of users and that there is an absence of public hearings. Also, the basis
for selecting standards for enforcement is not apparent. The major suggestion by
Joshi & Abdulla (1995) was that ICAI should review its accounting standards and in
order to monitor or to ensure compliance must incorporate legal enforcement. Th0y
found that a majority of corporate sector companies follow strict legal requirements
in the disclosure and preparation of financial statements. Apart from a few very
large progressive companies, no additional disclosures were found by the
companies. The findings of Joshi & Abdulla (1994) revealed that Indian investors
lack confidence in the company management's future forecasts. In addition Joshi &
Abdulla (1995, p. 120) suggested that there is absence in the reporting of future
forecasts among Indian companies due to competitive reasons and conservative

attitudes of management. Joshi & Abdulla (1995, p. 120) suggested that ASB
should ensure that accounting standards are universally applied and ICAI should
establish a Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to oversee ASB. The council should
prepare a conceptual framework for financial reporting purposes to meet the n~eds
of external users, since at present, external users are presented with financial
information on a take-it or leave-it basis.

In a study by Gupta, Saxena and Kaushik (2002) it was noted that enterprises in
India put very little information about the policies adopted by them in their financial
statements. The companies do not disclose all the accounting treatments as per the
norms of the accounting standards issued by ICAI. The auditors are also unaware
about the importance of the accounting standards and they perform their tasks as a
duty and don't want to take risk on account of their own profit.
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2.1.4

Summary

It was mentioned in the early stages of this literature review that a review of the

regulations and the accounting profession of India will give insight into the
effectiveness of regulations in aggregate disclosures by Indian companies. It was
found after the review that most Indian companies strictly follow the n::gulations

laid down by the Companies Act, 1956. In the event where the Companies Act does

not require detailed disclosure, companies may not publish detailed annual reports.
ICAI has been mostly successful in pursuing companies follow their accounting

standards, but the standards and standard setting processes have several drawbacks.
For instance most of the standards are initially advisory. Besides until 1999-2000,

the standards did not have legal enforcement.
The next section discusses the different measures of disclosure. The reason for
discussing different measures of disclosure is to identify the meaning of the tenn
disclosure and then progress with the discn::;;:,ion of types of disclosure. The
definition of the term aggregate disclosur,; has been derived through this discussion.
The different indexes that can be 1.;sed to measure aggregate disclosure has been
discussed first in the next section.

2.2

Measure of disclosures

2.2.1

Introduction

The tenn 'disclosure' has various meanings from the point of view of researchers.
Some use it to mean fuller disclosure levels while others use it to mean high quality
of information disclosure. It is a difficult task to measure disclosure because users
of information statements have varied information requirements. There are different
categories of users {such as investors, debtors, creditors, employees, regulatory
authorities) and various types of disclosure (such as voluntary, mandatory and
aggregate disclosure). For a long period of time researchers have used indexes to
measure disclosure. Amongst the various types of indexes used, researchers have
used weighted and unweighted index or both. It depends on the researcher and the
research objectives to decide on the measure of disclosure that was adopted.
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In the next section both weighted and unweighted indexes have been discussed in
detail followed by the explanations of the tenns mandatory, voluntary and aggregate
disclosures.

2.2.2

Weighted vs unweighted indexes

2.2.2,1

Weighted index

Singhvi (1968) was the first to examine adequate disclosure practices in the annual
reports of Indian companies. Singhvi (1968) used the term 'adequate disclosure
practices' to mean the completeness, accuracy and reliability of disclosures in
corporate annual reports. At the time when Singa'wi (1968) conducted the study,
only the Companies Act, 1956 was only in force. ICAI had not issued any
standards. Thus, by the tenn 'adequate disclosure', Singhvi (1968) meant disclosure
through regulation and voluntary disclosures. In order to measur~ disclosure, a
disclosure index was developed. The disclosure index used by Singhvi (1968) was
the modified version of the one used by Cerf (1961) for measuring disclosure by
companies in United States. Singhvi (1968) added and deleted a few items to the
index developed by Cerf (1961). Cerfs (1961) index consisted of 31 items of
infonnation.
Three items were deleted because they were not relevant to Indian corporations. Six
items were added to the index on the basis of the need of these items expressed by
other researchers. Singhvi (1968) assigned weights to the items to note distinctions
in their relative importance as indicated by various sub-committees of the
Committee on Corporate Information of United States, and also as indicated by the
security analysts interviewed.

Cerf (1961) introduced the method of assigning weights. Cerf (1961) selected the
items of information on the basis of a study of the investment decision process, a
review of literature describing how the decision should be made, interviews with
security analysts and an examination of analyst reports. Weights were assigned to
disclosure items to identify the relative importance of the items.
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However, the more popular method that is adopted by researchers is the method

developed by Buzby (1975).

Buzby (1975) constructed a disclosure index based on the following criteria. Firstly,
the item had to pertain to a set of industries, which could be characterised as
domestic manufacturing firm without significant extractive operations. By
excluding certain industries (for example financial, retailing and extractive) the
number of items of information to he included in the questionnaire could be kept
manageable. Besides, industry restriction also addrd a degree of homogeneity to the
questionnaire items. The second criterion required that there should be a reasonable
potential inter-firm variability in presenting the item in the annual report. This
criterion also aided in limiting the number of items to be included in the
questionnaire. The third criterion required that each item be applicable to every firm
in the annual report sample or be of such nature that a cross check would be
available to determine the item's applicability to a given firm.

This restriction

helped to determine whether the absence of an item from an annual report could be
considered a case of non-disclosure. Thirty-nine items of information were used to
construct the disclosure index.

A questionnaire was sent to 150 financial analysts. The purpose of the
questionnaire was to obtain weights for each item of infonnation according to the
opinions of the financial analysts. Weights were assigned to each of the thirty-nine
items of information on the basis of the weights assigned by the financial analysts.
The weight for each item was scaled between the ranges of 1 to 4. The weight of a
particular item was calculated by summing the integer values assigned to the item
and then dividing that total by the by the number of individuals who responded to
the item. This measure of disclosure was applied to the sample of 88 US
companies. Many researchers subsequently followed Buzby's weighted index. The
next section deals with the characteIU:tics of Wlweighted index.
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2.2.2.2

Unweighted Index

Some researchers prefer to use an unweighted disclosure index. Cooke ( 1989, 1992)
argued that attaching weights to items of infonnation is irrelevant because those

enterprises that are better at disciosing 'important items' are also better at disclosing
'less important items' or in other words, firms are consistent with their disclosure

policies. He used the above argument because the focus of his research was not one
group of users but all user groups. Cooke (1991, p. 179) stated that ..there is no
doubt that one class of user will attach different weights lo an item of disclosure

than another class of user but an approach which tried to encapsulate the subjective
weights of a multitude of user groups would be unwidrly and probably futile".

Wallace and Naser (1995, p. 331) suggested that weights are elicited from the
perceptions of one or two user-groups given the cost of pooling their opinions; but
one or two user groups are only a subset of users of the annual financial reports".
In an unweighted index I and O indicates the presen~ or absence of an itP,01
respectively. Some other researchers who used unweighted index are Inchausti
(1997), Davies & Kelly (1979), Ngurah (1990), Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) and

Hossain et al., (1994).

2.2.2.3

Weighted and unweighted index

The detennination of an index item weight is usually based on the relative perceived
importance by any one user group (Cerf. 1961, Singhvi & Desai, 1971 1 Buzby,
1975). For example, financial analysts may be asked to alloGate weights on items of
infonnation. Alternatively, an unweighted index scores each item equally (Cooke,
I 989).

Even though the weighted index has been often used in accounting research, it has
some drawbacks. For example as noted by Marston & Shrives (1991) there is an
unclear theoretical justification for the weighting and weighting a particular item
does not represent the exact importance of the item. It is just the perception of one
particular user or a class of users.
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Thus unweighted index is more popular amongst others. Chow & Wong-Boren
(1987, p. 537) had suggested that weighted and unweighted indexes are
interchangeable because their results are equivalent.

2.2.3

Mandatory vs voluntary vs aggregate disclosure

Amongst the different types of disclosure of financial infonnation, researchers
commonly discuss mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure or both.
Aggregate disclosure includes both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. The next
section discusses the different types of disclosures and the prior studies on each
particular type of disclosure.

2.2.3. i

Mandatory disclosure

In order to protect the interests of shareholders and other inte,ested parties, there are
various legal and institutional requirements governing corporate disclosure of
financial infonnation. These are called mandatory disclosures. If a company's
securities are listed in the stock exchange, the company has statutory obligations
(listing agreement of SEBI) to comply with the regulations under the stock
excf.ange requirements.

In addition, those business that are tenned companies, have to follow the disclosure
requir>"o :neats of the Companies Act, ( 1956). These legal requirements constitute the
minimurn amount of disclosures required by the companies. Some studies have
considered disclosure of mandatory items of infonnation in the corporate annual
reports ( \.hmed & Nicholls, 1994, Wallace Naser & Mora, 1994, Wallace & Naser,
1985).

In countries like Bangladesh (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994) found that

companies do not even comply with minimum legal requirements.

2.2.3.2

Voluntary disclosure

The mana,:;ers of tl:e companies have discretionary powers to disclose more
infonnation than the minimum requirements. These are voluntary disclosures. As
mentioned earlier, different users have different infonnation requirements.
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For example, shareholders are concerned with how much dividend they have earned
during the year. Potential investors are interested in the potential income and the
past perfonnance of the company. Creditors are interested in I.he company's ability
to service their loans. Employees are interested in the company's ability to pay their
wages and salaries. Therefore, in order for a company to detennine what
infonnation to disclose the management has to weigh its costs and benefits and only
when benefits e,.:ceed costs, the management will disclose infonnation voluntarily.
In such situations agency thec,ry can be used to describe the behaviour of managers
in disclosing information. In som~ countries managers have incentives to disclose
more information than the legal requirements. For example researchers like Chow &
Wong-Boren, 1987 (Mexico) and Raffournier, 1995 (Spain) have examined
voluntary items of infonnation disclosed by the companies in such countries.

2.2.3.3

Aggregate disclosure

Some studies consider both voluntary and mandatory items of information (Singhvi,

1968, Wallace 1987, Cooke, 1989, Inchausti, 1997). Researchers have measured
aggregate levels of disclosure in their studies. Aggregate levels of disclosure include
both voluntary and mandatory items of information, although the term "aggregate"
levels have been interchangeably used as comprehensive, adequate or fuller levels
of disclosure. Each tenn has its own meaning depending on the research purpose.

2.2.3.4

Summary

This section hss dealt with different types of indexes that are used to measure
.' disclosu1e and different types of disclosure are popular amongst researchers. The
uext section deals with the various company characteristics and their association
with disclosure. The next section also leads to the development of the theory for the
study.
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2.3

Company characterisfrics and disclosure

Cerfs (1961) study was designed not only to identify major disclosures, but to
explain through association with corporate attributes why some firms might
disclosure more than others. A number of corporate characteristics have been
examined across studies amongst which size of the finn, audit firm size, leverage
and listing status are a few common ones. Results from these studies are mixed,
probably because of the differing nature of dependent (disclosure) and the
independent variables (corporaie characteristics). In other words, the term
'disclosure' has a different meaning (that is the method in which it is measured)
from the point of view of researchers and similar corporate characteristics can be
measured in a variety of ways. For example, asset size or number of shareholders
can measure size.

One way of categorising the studies are through the objective of the study. Some
studies are directed towards 'capital raising' issue while others deal with 'costly
contracting'. Researchers like Singhvi & Desai (1971) suggest that companies have
higher quality of disclosure because they want to raise capital from the market.
Their study provides empirical evidence of the influence of corporate disclosure of
information on stock prices.

Some researchers try to explain differing levels of disclosure observed by
formulating hypothesis and carrying out univariate tests and/or multivariate tests to
see if selected company characteristics are successful in explaining different
disclosure scores. "The selection of explanatory variables can be theory driven, in
which case one or more relevant theories are identified and the model follows from
the theory. Agency theory is frequently employed in this context, either alone or in
conjunction with other theories" (Marston & Robson, 1997, p. 114).
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2.3.1

Capital raising

Singhvi and Desai (ICJ71, p. 136), indicate that in the absence of adequate corporate
disclosure of information, dispersion in the market price of a security is likely to be
wider than it would be othe1V1ise. Consequently, some corporations sell their
securities at a price, which is higher than the intrinsic value of the security, while
others sell for less than the intrinsic value. The cost of capital in the former case,
therefore, is likely to be lower than in the latter case if the intrinsic value of the
security is same for both. This shows that investment decisions by the investing
public affect the price of capital in the security markets, which in turn affects
decisions by corporate managements for investment of funds in new capital good or
inventories. Singhvi & Desai (1971) state that investors make uninformed decisions
because of lack of information in the security market. The quality of disclosure is
one of the variables that affect the prices of securities and as corporate disclosure
increases the variations in market prices of security tends to narrow down.

In India, companies are expected to disclose more while raising capital from the
stock market. This is primarily because of two important reasons. Firstly, when a
company raises capital it will have adhered to a number of stock exchange
requirements and also regulations of the Companies Act (1956). Secondly, in order
to raise capital, the companies will disclose more to display its capabilities of better
returns to investors and also in order to be competitive with other firms in the
domestic and international market. This type of disclosure is usually voluntary.

Thus, it can be expected that a company that rais~s capital from the stock market

will produce additional information because firstly it will comply with all legal
requirements and secondly it will attract investors by additional voluntary
information.
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2.3.2

Costly contracting

Agency theory has been very popular amongst several researchers to explain the
varying levels of disclosure within companies. Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 300)
define agency relationship as being a "contract under which one or more persons
[principal(s)] engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their
behalf which involves delegating decision making authority to the agent". The
relationship between the principal and the agent gives rise to 'agency costs',
because the agent is assumed to be utility maximiser, who acts in his/her best
interests, which may not be the best interest of the principal.

The magnitude of the agency costs incurred is rel:i.~ed to the amount of the conflict
of interest between the agent and the principal. Agency costs increase if there is a
significant conflict between the managers and the shareholders. Hence, in order to
control the agency costs, agent and the principal enter into a contract.

Agency theory is widely used by researchers to explain the variation in the levels of
disclosures amongst companies. Researchers like Marston & Robson (1997) have
used agency theory to explain why large companies with a large asset size disclose
more than other firms. Wallace & Naser (1995) have used agency theory to explain
why finns with large number of shareholders and audited by large audit finns
(monitoring costs) disclose more than other finns.

Agency theory provides a list of possible determinants of disclosure that can be
tested. This proposition is supported by the study of Marston & Robson (1997) on
Indian companies. They tested level of disclosure by Indian companies associated
with finn size. They argued that firms that have large asset size are more visible in
the eyes of the investors and the regulators. Hence they tend to disclose more than
others do.
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In countries like India, agency theory can be appropriately applied because while
agents (managers) stick to minimum statutory requirements, principals (investors)
demand more infonnation. This gives rise to a conflict of interest. When there is a
heavy conflict between the agents and the principal, production of infonnation may
be a motivation for reducing agency costs. Also, it is noted that agents will produce
infonnation to the extent that the benefits of production of information exceed the
costs of production of infonnation.

2.3.3

Summary

In summary, this section deals with two clear theories, capital raising theory and
agency theory. Both the theories deal with the manager's behaviour to react in
particular market conditions. The next section deals with the studies on developed
and developing countries on aggregate disclosure levels by companies. An overall
review of these studies will attempt to establish the motivation and significance of
the current study.

2.4

Studies of developed vs developing countries on aggregate
disclosures.

If disclosure by companies is related to the environment in which it is situated, then
it can be argued that corporate characteristics will influence corporate reporting
differently in the developed and developing countries. However, many developing
countries like India had a British influence in the past.

On this basis, it is possible to argue that exposure to the British
ways of doing business will result in the adoption of AngloSaxon accounting values which respond to the demands and
opportunities of a newly-industrialised society rather than
indigenous cultural forces. Again in contrast indigenous
cultural forces may be sufficiently powerful to impact on

23

accounting values that will make it different from the British
style of accounting (Wallace & Naser, 1995, p. 312).

A review of the studies on disclosure of developed and developing countries will
identify if there is any major impact of the local environment in the disclosure by
companies. Also, it will enable a clear understanding of disclosure by compruiies in
annual reports throughout the world.

Singhvi ( 1968) a.'ld Singhvi & Desai (1971) conducted similar studies on adequate
disclosme practices of India and USA. Singhvi (1968, p. 30) stated that annual
report to Indian stockholders is a very important form of periodical corporate
disclosure. The particular reason for the importance of annual reports in India are
that: ( 1) the Indian corporations are not required to prepare a separate report, similar
to 10-K report in the United States, for any regulatory agency, (2) infonnation
through personal contact is extremely difficult to obtain due to lack of co-operation
from corporate managements and (3) the non-company sources of infonnation are
very inadequate and seldom up to date. Thus, it is evident that apart from different
regulations, the environment of the country in which the companies operate,
contributes much to their actions and disclosure levels.

In an opposing argument, although Indian corporate annual report is a major source
of infonnation, investors in India (Joshi & Abdulla, 1995) are expected to make
more decisions based on word of mouth or instinct. The level of sophistication
amongst general investor groups in these countries will be very poor because
although most investors have the money to invest but they have little knowledge to
interpret corporate infonnation and make decisions. Also, as stated by Singhvi
(1968, p. 40), the majority of Indian investors associate stock market with
gambling. Consequently, a very small segment of the Indian population belongs to
the stockholder class. In summary, companies tend to disclose depending on the
beliefs and attitudes of people of the country.
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A brief review of the studies of developed and developing countries on aggregate
disclosure are given below. Each individual study is unique, depending on the
country on which it is done and also the research objectives of the author. However,
some developing countries have similarity with India because of the British ways of
accounting along with some cultural similarity.

Studies on developed countries bear rL"Sl.'TTiblancc with the current study because
they either have same theoretical framework or similar company characteristics that
were examined or a similar disclosure indc~ that was adopted to measure disclosure.

2.4.1

Developed countriH.

There are a number of studies that have investigated relationships between
corporate characteristics and disclosure practices of several developed countries.

For example, studies have been done on companies in Australia (Davies & Kelly,
1979), Japan (Cooke, 1992, 1993), Sweden (Cooke 1989), US (Cerf, 1961, Singhvi
& Desai, 1971, Buzby 1975, Imhoff, 1992), Hong-Kong (Wallace & Naser, 1995)
and Spain (lnchausti, 1997). The studies can be classified into a number of different
ways.

Firstly, the point of distinction may arise on the use of theory by the researcher.
Secondly, there may be variation in the type of index adopted between researchers.
Thirdly, variation in the number of company characteristics or variation in the
measure of the same company characteristic may arise. Fourthly, there may be
differences in results due to different statistical measures adopted by the
researchers. Thus the studies that have been discussed addresses these four issues
critically.

CeI'f,(1961) was the first to point o"Jt empirically that the quality of disclosure is
affected by a number of variables and often there is interdependence between these
variables. Cerfs study is very interesting because it is one of the first kind to show
the relationship between disclosure and firm characteristics.
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The purpose of the study was to identify the firm characteristics associated with
disclosure in annual reports of US companies.

Cerf (1961) used a theory to explain why some finns disclose more than others. In
order to measure disclosure, Cerf (1961) developed an index of disclosure by
specifying and weighting the types of infonnation that might appear in the annual
reports.

This index was then applied to the annual reports of 527 US companies. The annual
report scores were used to assess whether a number of corporate characteristics
were associated with the extent of disclosure.

The four major firm characteristics that were used were asset size, ownership
distribution, profitability and listing status. Cerf (1961) found that there was a
positive association between disclosure and asset size, number of shareholders,
listing status and rate of return. This continued that large listed firms disclose more
than others. One of the drawbacks of this study is that the significance of these
relationships was not tested statistically. As indicated by Singhvi & Desai (1971, p.
131) analysis by means of classes, as Cerf has done, is not sufficient.

Cerf's work was refined and extended by Singhvi & Desai (1971). Singhvi and
Desai (1971, p. 136), indicate that in absence ofadeguate corporate disclosure of
information, dispersion in the market price of a security is likely to be wider than it
would be otherwise. This implies that investment decisions by the investing public
affect the price of capital in the security markets, which in tum affects decisions by
corporate managements for investment of funds in new capital goods or inventories.
In brief Singhvi & Desai (1971) used the 'capital raising theory' to explain why
some firms disclose more than others. A disclosure index was developed similar to
that of Cerf (1961) and weighted as per the ratings of the security analysts. Singhvi
& Desai (1971) added some more independent variables to the ones already used by

Cerf (1961). Their independent variable list included asset size, listing status,
number of shareholders, earnings margin, rate of return and audit (CPA) finn size.
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In order to measure the association between the independent variables and quality of
disclosure, a multivariate Iiaear regression model was designed. Singhvi & Desai
(1971) found a positive association between disclosure and asset size, number of

shareholders, CPA firms, T21te of return and earnings margin. Asset size, number of
shareholders and CPA firm were significant at 0.01 level with chi square test. Rate
of return was significant at 0.02 level and earnings margin at 0.05 level.

Although Buzby (1975) used only two corporate attributes in his study (size and
listing status),4 his method of weighting each item of information in the disclosure
index has been adopted subsequently by various researchers. Buzby constructed a
disclosure index based on the infonnational requirements of financial analysts.
Thirty-nine items ofinfunnation were used to construct a disclosure index. Weights
were assigned to each of the thirty-nine items of information on the basis of the
weights assigned by the financial analysts. This measure of disclosure was applied
tothesampleof88 US companies.

The results obtained by Buzby indicated that the extent of disclosure in annual
reports is positively associated with the size of company's assets and not with the
listing status. Buzby (1971) used Kendall rank correlation coefficient to measure
the extent of disclosure and asset size and listing status. These results are consistent
with those of Cerf s (1961) results but not with that of Singhvi & Desai (1971). 5

Barrett (1976) conducted a study on disclosure and comprehensiveness of financial
reporting in annual reports of companies in United States, Japan, UK, Germany,
France, Sweden and Netherlands. The index constructed by Barrett (1976) to
measure disclosure was adopted from the studies of Cerf (1961), Singhvi & Desai
(1971) and Buzby (1971 ). The weighting of the index was also similar to that of

Cerf, Singhvi & Desai and Buzby. Barrett's study compared the level of disclosure
between British and American finns and firms in other countries.
4
Listing status can take several forms. For instance, Buzby (1975) used listing status to mean
companies listed in NYSE or otherwise.
5
Several points should be kept in mind while interpreting the results. As mentioned by Buzby (1975,
p. 30) that the extent of disclosure is not synonymous with the adequacy of disclosure; rather, it is a
subcomponent of adequate disclosure.
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It was seen in this study that British and American finn's financial statements were

more comprehensive than compared to other countries. Barrett indicated that the
general belief that there is a link between the quality of financial reporting practice
and degree of efficiency of national equity markets is valid. Thus, a conclusion can
be drawn that Anglo-American equity markets are more efficient than the rest of the
countries that were tested.

Barrett's (1976) study is important because in an international setting even the
developed countries have varying levels of disclosure within themselves. So one can
say that disclosure by companies depends on each individual country and its
environment and also disclosure impacts the stock markets immensely.

Imhoff ( 1992) examined several firm characteristics that are related to the
accounting quality 6 (similar to the term fuller disclosures) of US firms and also if
the security price reaction to accounting news varies based on differences in
accounting quality. Earnings were the most critically examined variable in this
study. The two other independent variables apart from earnings announcement were
leverage and firm size. It was hypothesised in the study that high (low) quality finns
were expected to be associated with more (less) predictable earnings; smaller
(larger) forecast revisions and forecast errors; and fewer (more) bad news surprises
at earnings announcement date. Also it was hypothesised that firms with relatively
high (low) accounting quality will have a larger (smaller) unexpected price
response.
Seven industries were selected for the study. A total of 185 companies comprising
of all industries were examined. A total of 266 security analysts that specialised in a
particular industry type were asked to give opinions on the accounting quality of
their industry. Analysts accounting quality ratings were found to be higher for larger
finns and finns with relatively low debt-equity ratio. Accounting quality differences.
were also noted in several important characteristics of earnings. These differences
indicate that firms with relatively high (low) accounting quality tend to have more

6

High accounting quality refers to the full financial disclosures b;- companies.
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(less) predictable earnings; less (more) annual earnings forecast revisions; smaller
(larger) annual forecast errors and fewer (more) bad earnings announcements. It was
also found that finns with higher accounting quality generate larger and more
significant price responses. Apart from US there have been disclosure stud.,ies in
other developed countries too.
Cooke, (1989) examined the disclosure practices of Swedish companies and
Japanese companies (Cooke, 1992, 1993) in their corporate annual report. For these
two countries the various variables examined by Cooke were the size, listing
status,
:- ,.-

7

number of shareholders, industry type and !)arent company relationshiJ)$;"\Ciioke
(1992, 1993) used annual reports of Japanese and Swedish companie5't~\i~~~~re
disclosure. Cooke (1992, 1993) found size, listing status and industry type to be
significant variables. Cooke (1992, 1993) used an unweighted index comprising of a
number of information items. Cooke (1993) adopted the capital raising approach
and argued that the prime motive of disclosure is to raise capital at lowest cost.
Companies increase aggregate disclosures because they are more prone to public
scrutiny. That is why listed companies disclose more than unlisted and those with
multiple listing disclose more.
Inchausti ( 1997) conducted an empirical analysis of the impact of market pressure
and pressure from regulatory agencies on the accounting infonnation disclosure by
Spanish finns. Inchausti (1997) used positive accounting theory (including agency
theory, political process theory and signalling theory) to explain the association
between finn characteristics and disclosure.

An unweighted index was used to

measure disclosure in 49 annual reports. In order to analyse the effect of regulation
on disclosure practices by companies, annual reports of three different years were
examined. Results indicated that regulation had an impact on the improvement of
disclosure practices of Spanish finns.

Inchausti ( 1997) also examined several

corporate characteristics (namely size, stock exchange listing, profitability,
leverage, audit finn, industry and dividend payout) that influence disclosure

7

Cooke used the term listing status to mean those companies with domestic listing, companies with
multiple listing or listed vs unlisted companies.
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practices. Using a stepwise regression model it was found that size, audit firm and
stock exchange listing have positive influence on level of disclosure.

Wa11ace and Naser (1995) examined the comprehensiveness of disclosure and firm
characteristics in the companies listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange (HKSE).
Wallace & Naser (1995) used positive accounting theory to explain why some finns
disclose more than others.
The finn characteristics that were considered were foreign registration of finns
listed on HKSE, profit margin, earnings return, liquidity ratio, leverage, finn size,
proportion of shares held by outsiders, market capitalisation, scope of business
operations and auditor size. In order to measure disclosure, an unweighted
disclosure index was constructed to suit all user groups.

The disclosure index consisted of mandated items, common or a usual item that
appear in the annual reports and items that have appeared in the previous studies. In
total, 30 items of information was used in the disclosure index. A sample of 80
annual reports was used in the study and results (regression analysis) indicated that
profit margin, asset size, scope of business operations and auditor size were
significant variables.

2.4.2

Developing countries

The study that can be cited for aggregate disclosure practices by companies in a
developing country is the study of Ngurah (l 996) on Indonesia. Ngurai1 (1996)
examined the association between disclosure and finn characteristics of Indonesian
companies. The finn characteristics that were examined were asset size, number of
shares owned by public, rate of return and earnings margin in Indonesian company
annual reports. A disclosure index was constructed and weighted based on the
opinions of managers, financial executives and stockbrokers. A total of 191
responses to the questionnaires were received and disclosure was examined in 63
annual reports. However, results showed that \here was no association between
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disclosure levels and finn characteristics. The study did not give any explanations
regarding why no variables were associated with disclosure.
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Several studies on either voluntary or mandatory disclosures by companies have
been done on developing countries. For instance, Chow & Wong-Boren (1987)
examined the voluntary disclosure practices of Mexican companies, Tong, Kidman
& Cheong (1990) as well as Hossain, Tan & Adams (1994) examined the voluntary

disclosure practices of Malaysian companies. Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) examined
the mandatory disclosure practices of Bangladeshi companies, Patton & Zelenka
( 1997) examined mandatory disclosure practices of companies of Czech Republic
and Owusu-Ans ah ( 1998) examined the impact of corporate attributes on the extent
of mandatory disclosure practices of companies in Zimbabwe.
2,S

Studies on India

Singhvi ( 1968) was the first to examine the some of the characteristics of Indian
corporations associated with the quality of disclosure in the annual reports. Singhvi
( I 968, p. 29) argued that

Adequate and accurate corporate disclosure of infonnation is
important to allocate economic resources efficiently in a market
economy and to enable investors to make investment decisions
which wilt safeguard their interest against fraudulent securities
practices. The quality of corporate disclosure influences the
quality of investing decisions made by the investing public
Singhvi ( I 968, p. 29).

The study also identified some of the probable implications of the quality of
corporate disclosure in annual reports.
In order to measure the quality disclosure, Singhvi adopted the index used by Cerf
(1961). However, a few more items were added to the index to make it more
comprehensive and adequate. Singhvi ( 1968) admitted that if all those items that
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were included in his index were included in the annual reports of Indian
corporations then investors would make more informed decisions.

Weights were assigned to the items of infonnation on the basis of the opinions of
security analysts (number of security analysts was not given in the study) and
various sub-committees of the Committee of Corporate Infonnation.
The weights ranged from one to four. By using the index Singhvi quantified the
quality of disclosure in the annual reports. The sample of 45 annual reports (from
the investors Indian year book) represented four percent of the entire population of
companies listed in the stock exchange.

Singhvi (1968) examined six company characteristics associated with quality of
disclosure. The six corporate characteristics that were examined were asset size,
profitability, rate of return, size of the audit firm, multinational company (MNC)
influence and ownership distribution. Using the Chi Square test, it was found that
asset size, rate of return, type of management and number of stockholders are
significant variables at I % level. Earnings margin was found to be significant at 5

% level while size of the audit finn was not found to be significant at all.

The study of Singhvi (1968) also identified some of the probable implications of the
quality of corporate disclosure in annual reports.

More superior the quality of corporate disclosure of
information, the lesser the scope for speculation, and the
narrower will be the price fluctuations. Since prices of
co1porate disclosure are based on estimated earnings and the
earnings are estimated on the basis of the information available
about corporate operations, the price fluctuations are likely to
be less wide with the better disclosure of infonnation Singhvi
(1968, p. 39).
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Results from Chi square tests indicate that quality of disclosure is positively
associated with security prices at I % level.

One of the major limitations of the study of Singhvi (1968) is that it is a very old
study. India had changed politically and economically since 1968.The study is not
relevant in the current context. For example, for the variable 'type of management~,

Singhvi (1968) argued that the quality of disclosure by Indian management is
inferior to the quality of disclosure by foreign management. Indian managements
were considered inferior because most managers did not have a professional
qualification and thus they were less aware of the advantages of better disclosure of
information as well as less responsive to the needs of the investing public. The
situation has changed in India now and most Indian managers have professional
qualifications. However, multinational corporations still produce more information,
because they have to generate a large amo ..mt of data for their own use and thus they
can disclose more. Besides, when they operate in different countries they have to
comply with regulations of all such countries thereby generating more information
than domestic companies.

Another important limitation is the only univariate analysis was conducted on the
data. In order to detennine the relationship between more than two corporate
characteristics and disclosure a multivariate analysis is considered more appropriate.
Multivariate analysis is multi-dimensional and allows the effects of one or more
variable to be considered at one time.

Marston & Robson (1997) did a more recent study on disclosure by Indian
companies. Marston & Robson (1997) examined disclosure in the annual reports of
large Indian companies for the period 1982-83 and 1989-90. The purpose of the
study was to ex.amine the increase in disclosure by Indian companies between 198283 and 1989-1990.
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They adopted the Barrett's (1976) seventeen-point index for measuring disclosure.
Marston & Robson (1997) argued that Barrett's (1976) index is simple and Indian
financial reporting is relatively unsophisticated. A complicated index with many
items of infonnation will have many items that are not applicable to Indian
companies.

This is because Indian accounting is not so developed and if an index applicable to a
developed country is adopted, then there will be a number of non-applicable items.
Besides Barrett's index is more comprehensive than Singhvi's (1968) index because
Barrett's (1976) index is a combination ofCerf(1961), Singhvi & Desai (1971) and
Buzby's (1974) index. All items that would represent appropriate disclosure are
included in Barrett's index. No weights were attached to the index.

Marston & Robson ( 1997) selected a population of 92 companies for the study. The
final sample consisted of only 29 pairs of annual reports (for the two periods
mentioned above). The researchers consider that it was fairly good response
considering the political turmoil at the time of the study.

A bivariate analysis was conducted to test the differences in disclosure in 1982/83
and 1989/90. It was found that disclosures by Indian companies have increased over
time and that there is an increase in accounting standard disclosure requirements as
well as an increase in the compliance with the existing standards. It was found that
larger companies (finn size) disclosed more than smaller companies. It is to be
noted in this study that the researchers concluded that disclosures improved because
of increased compliance with the accounting standards and not because of voluntary
disclosure of information by companies.

A major limitation of this study is the sample size. Marston & Robson ( 1997)
acknowledged in their study that due to the small size of the sample they could not
construct a multivariate model.
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Apart from Marston & Robson, no other study can be cited that examined
disclosure with firm characteristics in India. However, Joshi & Abdulla conducted
two studies in (1994 & 1995) on India. Joshi & Abdulla (1994) examined the
infonnation requirements of Indian investors within the corporate annual reports
and Joshi & Abdu11a ( 1995) examined the accounting environment in India and the
major limitations of the standard setting process in India. Both these studies are
reviewed below.

The study of Joshi and Abdulla (1995) examined the accounting standard setting
process and the practices of corporate financial reporting by 95 large sized
companies in their annual reports. In discussing the standard setting process of
India, Joshi & Abdulla (1995) indicated that the composition of the members of the
Accounting Standard Board (ASB) does not include different categories of users.

Thus, all categories of users are not represented directly in the standard setting
process. There is an absence of public hearing in the standard setting process in
India, which is considered an important part in the process of setting standards in
the rest of the accounting world.

Another important comment made by Joshi & Abdulla (1995) in their study was
that Indian accounting standards have many alternative choices, which may be
acceptable as per GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles), but financial
statements prepared under different accounting alternatives may not be comparable.
Besides, the companies are free to change their accounting methods (if
circumstances pennit) but the accounting standards do not specify the circumstances
under which such a change can be made.

Joshi & Abdulla ( 1995) noted that the preparers of financial statements of India do
not come under the direct control of ICAI and the prime responsibility for preparing
financial statements lie with the Board of Directors. If agency theory is applied in
this situation, it is evident that companies will disclose keeping in mind their best
interests and not the interests of the investors. Besides, compliance with the
accounting standards does not guarantee presentation of a 'true and fair view'.
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As pointed out by Joshi & Abdulla (1995), occasionally there is a lot of pressure on
accountants and auditors to accept accounting treatments that are in breach of the
standards. Users often do not read the auditors report and thus even if there is a
qualification there is a possibility that might have been ignored.

Finally, Joshi & Abdulla (1995) found in their examination of95 annual reports that
a majority of corporate sector companies follow strict legal requirements in the
disclosure and preparation of financial statements barring a few multinational and
large domestic companies.

Joshi and Abdulla (1994) investigated the infonnation requirements. of Indian
investors within the annual reports. They categorised Indian investors into two
categories, sophisticated (157 respondents) and unsophisticated (55 respcndents). A
questionnaire was sent to the respondent and they were asked to weight each item of
information. While both categories of users had different preferences on
infonnation items, some items were considered important by both the user groups.
Both user groups considered for instance value-added statements and cash profit per
share to be important. It was found that there were significant differences in the
infonnation requirements between both groups. Joshi & Abdulla (1994) argued that
Indian investors lack confidence in the company management's future forecasts.

Commenting on the abridged form of reporting by Indian companies, Joshi &
Abdulla ( I 994, p. 6) stated that "the abridged for of accounts have been introduced
because Indian investors, while making invesbnent decisions, rely heavily on the
basis of their own instinct, friendly tips and general market behaviours of share
prices in the stock market and rely very little on the information extracted from the

annual reports". Joshi & Abdulla (1994) indicated that the abridged form of
reporting by Indian companies needs to be reconsidered. High performing
companies which once adopted more or less full disclosure policies now have
curtailed a range of information they revealed earlier. Companies should be required
to prepare more comprehensive reports to more fully respond to the diverse needs of
the investors.
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The most recent study of Gupta, Saxena and K.aushik (2002) investigated 266
private-sector manufacturing companies to see if the accounting standards issued by
ICAI have been followed by these companies. In order to measure compliance with
accounting standards a period starting from 1995-96 to 1999-2000 was considered.
The researchers also designed a questionnaire (self-structured questionnaire) that
they used to measure compliance. The researchers analysed the application of all the
mandatory accounting standards in the financial reports of Indian companies.

A chi square test was used for each and every accounting standard application in the
annual reports by companies. It was noted that although companies were trying to
follow the accounting standards issued by ICAI, due to the lack of legal pressure
auditor's awareness about their responsibility towards the regular checking of
compliance with the accounting standards, not all companies fulfil all requirements
as per the standards.

2.6

Summary

The review of literature indicates that Indian finns have fewer incentives to disclose
more than what is required by regulation. However, predictions can be made
regarding the situations firms are likely to disclose more. In this regard the costly
contracting and capital raising framework can be used.

Past studies have

successfully used these two frameworks for measuring di:Jclosure. The theoretical
framework of this study is developed on the basis of the above mentioned premises.
Detailed review of the theories used in this study has been discussed in the next
chapter. A summary (Table 2) of the most significant disclosure studies that relate
to this study have been given in the next page.
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Table2
List of empirical studies examined in the literature review.

Country of study
Name of the
author/s/Year
Marston & Robson, India

Variables used

Significant variables

Rema.-!i.3

Finn size

Firm Size

Firm size, rate ofretum,
profitability, size of the audit
finn, MNC influence and
ownership distribution
Finn Size, ownership

Finn size, rate of
return, MNC influence
and number of

Current ~tudy on firm
character;stics and Indian
company disclosure.
Earliest study on finn
characteristics and Indian
company disclosure.

1997
Singhvi, 1968

India

Cerf, 1961

USA

listing status
Firm size, listing status,
number of sh3reholders

earnings margin, rate of

size, rate of return and

return and audit firm size,
Size and listing status

earnings margin.
Size

distribution, profitability and
Singhvi & Desai, 1971

Buzby, 1975

USA

USA

stockholders
Asset size, ownership
distribution and listing
status
Finn size, number of
shareholders, audit firm

Earliest study in a developed
country
Study was designed in line
withthestudyofCerf.1961.

The method used by Buzby
to weigh each item of

information was adopted in
bnhoff, 1992
::-- .

USA

Earnings announcement,
l~erage and firm size

Earnings
announcement

several studies.
A more recent study of US

on accounting quality and
securi rice reaction
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Table 2 (contd)
List of empirical studies examined in the literature review.
Name of the
author/s/Year
Cooke, 1989

Country of study Variables used
Sweden

Cooke, 1992

Japan

Cooke, 1993

Japan

Inchausti, 1997

Wallace
1995

and

Ngruah, 1996

Spain

Naser, Hong Kong

Indonesia

Significant variables

Remarks

Listing Status, firm size,
annual sales, number of
shareholders and parent
company relationship.
Size, listing status, number
of shareholders, industry
type and parent company
relationships
Size, listing status, number

Listing status and size Study on disclosure by
companies
and
firm
characteristics on different
country.
Size, listing status and
The study is very similar to
industry type.
the one done on Swedish
companies

of shareholders, industry

industry type.

type and parent company
relationships
Size, listing status,
profitability, leverage, audit
firm, industry type and
dividend payout
Listing status, profit margin,
earnings return, liquidity,
leverage, size, ownership
distribution, market
, capitalisation, scope of
business operations and
auditor size
Size, ownership distribution,

of the finn

Size, listing status and

Similar study

Size, audit firm and
listing status

Relatively new study on
disclosure practices of
Spanish companies

Profit margin, asset
size, scope of business
and auditor size.

Relatively new study on
disclosure practices of Hong
Kong companies

None

None of the variables were

rate of return, earnings

found significant in the

mar

stud .
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CHAPTER3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

3.1

Introduction

In the literature review it was identified that Indian companies disclose information
in their annual reports mainly because of three reasons. Firstly, they disclose due to
the regulations required by law, secondly they disclose when companies want to

raise capital from the stock market and thirdly managers or agents disclose
information to reduce agency costs. The theoretical framework of this study has
been based on the above three premises. For a better understanding of the above
three factors, the theoretical framework has been sub-divided into three major

sections.

The first section deals with various regulations that guide Indian company
disclosures. The second section deals with the disclosure by companies through
capital market demand and the third section deals with costly contracting. The
costly contracting section deals with the agency-principal relationship in firms that
lead to disclosure. A number of variables that have been developed later in the
study are based on these three sections.

3.2

Disclosure by regulation

There are several regulations governing corporate reporting and disclosure in India.
The foremost regulation is the rules of the Companies Act (1956). In addition,
companies listed in a recognised stock exchange in India have to meet the listing
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). From 2000
onwards, accounting standards issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India regulate the reporting choices available to managers in presenting the finn 's
financial statements.
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3.2.1

Regulation offmancial reporting choices

Accounting standards regulate the reporting choices available to managers in
presenting the firm's financial statements. This type of regulation reduces the
processing costs for financial statement users by providing a commonly accepted
language that managers can use to communicate with the users. However, in such a
situation, it is important to note that the objectives of the standard setters should be
the same as the objectives of the users. Researchers in the past have argued that
regulators tend to be captured by those who regulate. Past research (Joshi &
Abdulla, 1994) on Indian standard setting processes provided evidence that ASB
(Accounting Standard Board) is not represented by all groups of the users. The
likelihood that the objectives of standard setters being different from all categories
of users are apparent. It can be deduced that those who regulate accounting in India
may have their agendas put first instead of the interest of the common users. Thus,
disclosure may not be termed 'aggregate' from the point of view of all users.

Prior to I ~99-2000, a number of accounting standards issued by ICAI (although
pronounced mandatory by ICAI) were not given a legal status by the Companies
Act, 1956. The Companies Act (1956), by section 211 (3C}, made the accounting
standards of !CAI mandatory from 1999-2000. For the financial year 1999-2000,
these accounting standards had the force of law and the time of this study is 19992000. It would be useful to observe the effect of firm characteristics in influencing
the disclosure by Indian companies immediately prior to the introduction of law.

3.3

Disclosure by capital market demand

Disclosure of information by companies is intended to make valuable contributions
to the dedsion-makirig processes by investors. Singhvi & Desai (1971) emphasise
that complete, accurate and reliable disclosure {adequate disclosure) influence to a
great extent the quality of investment decisions made by the investors. Their study
provides empirical evidence on the influence of corporate disclosure of information
on stock prices.
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In absence of adequate corporate disclosure of infonnation,
dispersion in the market price of a security is likely to be wider
than it would be otherwise. Consequently some corporations
sell thu;r securities at a price, which is higher than the intrinsic
value of the security, while others sell for less than the intrinsic
value. The cost of capital in the fonner case therefore, is likely
to be lower than in the latter case if the intrinsic value of the
security is same for both. This shows that the investment
decisions by the investing public affect the price of capital in
security markets Singhvi and Desai (1971, p. 136).

In brief, the quality of disclosure is one of the variables that affect the prices of
securities and also when corporate disClosure increases the wide variations in
market prices of security tends to narrow down. In other words, i:-:~reased disclosure
leads to less fluctuation in market prices because investors can make infonned
decisions with increased disclosure. "It is also likely that corporations with poor
earnings, when required to disclose full and fair information might be weedeJ out of
the securities market because it will be difficult for such corporations to raise capital
at a reasonable cost" (Singhvi & Desai, 1971, p. 136).

When a finn tries to raise capital from the stock market in India, it is expected that it
will disclose more than the other finns that are not raising capital, because it will try
to demonstrate its capabilities of better utilisation of investor resources. Besides in a
perfect market, companies will disclose information to remain in the market,
because they don't want to be the 'lemons' of the market (Healy & Palepu, 2001).
The integrity of the capital market relies on the notion of fairness and trust, and
those labelled as 'lemons' have lost the investor confidence by demonstrating their
incapability of proper disclosures.
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The conflict between the managers and the owners of the company is perennial in
nature. The owners always demand more information and the agents disclose what
is cost effective for them. The costs that arise due to such conflicts are often termed
as agency costs. Agency theory gives rise to the notion of costly contracting that is
described in the next section.

3.4

Disclosure by costly contracting

The agency problem arises because investors do not take part in the day to day
running of the business and so the responsibility is delegated to the management of
the company. Thus, when investors invest their funds in business the management
has an incentive to make decisions to expropriate their funds. Healy & Palepu,
(2001) explain that when investors acquire an equity stake in a firm, the
entrepreneur can use those funds to acquire perquisites, pay excesshe
compensation, or make investments or operating decisions that are harmful to the
interests of outside investors. However, investor's perceptions of a finn are
important to corporate managers expecting to issue equity and in such a situation
the managers will disclose more to reduce the cost of financing. Such conflicting
situations lead to agency problem.

An agency relationship gives rise to agency costs because the agents or managers
are expected to act in their own self-interest which may not be consistent with the
interests of the owners (principals). The magnitude of the agency costs incurred is
related to the amount of the conflict of interest that exists between the agent and the
principal. However, one solution to the agency problem is if the agent and the
principal enter into a contract to control these conflicts of interests, then it could
increase the wealth of both the agent and the principal.

Agency theory can be used to develop a set of testable hypotheses about the
information disclosed in the corporate annual reports. Agency theory provides a
framework for analysing and predicting accounting policy choices. In the Indian
context, agency theory has been successfully used.
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The study of Marston & Robson (1997) used agency theory to explain why larger
(with large asset size) finns disclose more than others. In this study agency theory
has been used to hypothesise that a number of variables can be associated with
disclosure by Indian companies. The next section deals with the hypothesis
development using agency theory and capital raising approach.

3.S

Hypotheses development

To examine the relationship between the level of aggregate disclosure and firm
characteristics, each finn can be identified by eight classificatory characteristics.
The eight characteristics in this study are sub-classified into three categories:
structure-related, perfonnance related and market-related (Wallace & Naser, 1995).
Perfonnance-related variables are time-period specific. In other words, these
variables indicate the performance of a company for a specific period or a financial
year. Management have preferential access over these infonnations. Liquidity and
profitability are performance-related variables. Indicators like liquidity and
profitability are only valid for a specified period of time or a particular year.
Structure related variables are those that are likely to remain stable over a period of
time. So variables like firm size wil1 not change every fin:m,~fal year but remain
unchanged for more that one year or a period of time. Firm size, leverage,
ownership diffusion and multinational company influence (MNC) are structurerelated variables. Market variables are either time-specific or relatively stable over
time and are either within or outside the control of the firm. For instance, audit firm
size and capital raising through investors are market-related variables.

3.5.1

Structure-related variables

Structure-related variables can be the possible predictors of the level of aggregate
disclosure in Indian corporate annual reports. The two structure-related variables
here are firm size and leverage and the theoretical motivation and the hypothesis
development are discussed below
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Firm size

There are several studies, which have found that a significant association exists
between the size of a company and the extent of disclosure levels (aggregate,
voluntary and mandatory) in the corporate annual report in both developed and
developing countries. Studies of Singhvi, 1968, Singhvi & Desai, 1971, Buzby,
1975, McNally et al, 1982, Chow & Wong Boren, 1987, Cooke 1989, Ahmed &
Nicholls, 1994, Hossain et al, 1994, Wallace & Naser, 1995, Raffoumier, 1995,
Inchausti, 1997, are some ofth,, examples.

Larger companies are hypothesised to disclose more infonnation in their company
annual reports than smaller companies for a variety of reasons.

First, larger finns have the funds and expertise for the publication of detailed annual
reports. Larger finns usually make many products and they are distributed over
large geographical areas and hence they naturally produce large amount of
infonnation for internal control. Thus, it is easier for larger firms to publish more
information than smaller finns.

Second, l2rge firms are generally exposed to political attacks, such as societal
demands for environmental issues (like pollution), for greater regulation such as
price controls, higher corporate taxes and a threat of nationalisation. By disclosure,
such actions can be minimised.

Third, Singhvi & Desai (1971, p. 131) suggest a smaller firm is more likely to feel,
than a larger firm, that greater disclosure would be detrimental to its
competitiveness. The reason behind that is small finns does not have the expertise
and infrastructure for demonstration to the investors in compruison to larger finns
and greater disclosure will mean greater exposure. They fear that greater exposure
may make them less valuable in the eyes of the investors.
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Firm size can be measured in a variety of ways, for example: total assets, net sales,
number of employees, or market capitalisation value of the firm. In this study, the
market value of the firm's Lquity shares is used for measuring size. This measure
seems to be more objective because market capitalisation represents an externally
detennined measure of a firm's importance as seen by the investing pub1ic (Wa1lace
& Naser, 1995, p. 322). Market capita1isation for the end of the financial year was

taken for the purposes of the study. The hypothesis developed for firm size is as
follows:

Hl: Larger companies will have higher levels of aggregate disclosure.

Leverage

Among the limited number of Indian studies on disclosure and firm characteristics,
leverage was not used by any of the researchers. However, various researchers have
studied leverage or debt-equity ratio in the past because it is considered to be an
important variable. In other countries, researchers such as Chow & Wong-Boren

(1987), Ahmed & Nicholls, (1994), Hossain et al. (1995), Wallace et al. (1994),
Wa11ace & Naser (1995), lnchausti (1997) found no significant association between
debt-equity ratio and level of disclosure. Belkaoui & Kahl (1978) found a negative
relationship between debt-equity ratio and level of disclosures while Hossain et al.
(1994) found no significant association between leverage and disclosure levels. It is
important to include this variable because it has never been included in studies on
India and it would be interesting to note the effect of leverage in disclosure practices
by Indian .::ompanies.

It can be argued that companies having more debt in their financial structure will
disclose more. Highly geared companies may disclose more information (in special
purpose reports) to suit the needs of lenders and thus bear increased monitoring
costs in the fonn of more disclosures. In addition, these companies may disclose
more infonnation to restore confidence amongst 'lareholders that their company is
L

doing well.
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In India the Development Financial Institution (DFI) require those companies who
wish to borrow money to fulfil a number of requirements. The submission of the
annual report is one of them. Companies with high borrowings can expect to be
monitored more closely by financial institutions and may be required to furnish
infonnation

(in special purpose reports and general.purpose reports) more

frequently than companies having a smaller amount of debt. Hence, companies with
large borrowings may disclose more than companies with a smaller amount of debt.
In order to measure leverage, total liabilities over total assets will be considered in
this study. The following hypothesis will be used to test leverage. The hypothesis
has been developed keeping in mind the requirements of DFI to disclose more.

H2: Companies with higher leverage will have higher levels of aggregate disc1osure
of financial infonnation.

Ownership disti"ibution

Finns with widely held shares might account for some differences in the level of
aggregate disclosures by Indian manufacluring companies. Wallace and Naser
(1995, p. 323) argue that if issuing financial statements could solve the monitoring
problems associated with the increases in number of shares held by outsiders, then
one would expect that financial disclosure would be more comprehensive with the
increase in the number of shares held by outsiders.

In countries, where the state (e.g., China), banks (e.g., Gennany), or certain families
(e.g., Hong Kong) have substantial equity holdings, or, in other words, have highly
concentrated equity ownerships, there is no separation of ownership from control.
In such cases, owners have greater access to information and may not have
additional or higher levels of disclosure for protecting their investments (Owusu~
Ansah, 1998). However, for India, due to the nature of the sample (all listed
companies), separation of ownership from control is expected to be found.
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Ownership diffusion was found to be significantly associated with mandatory
disclosure levels in the study of Owusu-Ansah (1998). It was found as an
insignificant variable in several others studies for example; Hossain et al. (1994)
and Raffoumier, (1995). Singhvi & Desai (1968) used ownership distribution as one
of their variables. However, they found no significant association between
ownership distribution and disclosure levels of Indian companies. The hypothesis
developed for ownership distribution is as below.

H3: There is no association between levels of aggregate disclosures and firms with
widely or clos.ely held shares.

Multinational company (MNC) affiliation

The subsidiaries in developing countries of parent multinational companies from
developed countries or companies with the presence or participation of a foreign
management are likely to disclose more infonnation than their local counterparts for
several reasons.

Firstly, the parent multinational of these subsidiaries is usually from developed
countries, where the standards of reporting are higher than in developing countries.
These subsidiaries can be expected to generate more infonnation to comply with
more stringent internal accounting standards of their parent multinational and at the
same time meet the requirements of the country in which they operate (Ahmed &

Nicholl~ 1994).
Secondly, it has been argued that the political costs for these subsidiaries may be
higher in developing countries than in developed countries because they are more
prone to scrutiny. This is because the subsidiaries are international finns with
different methods of financial reporting. In addition, subsidiaries of multinational
companies in developing countries may have a significant contribution in the
economies of their host countries.
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So the companies may risk the threat of government control, even the threat
including nationalisation if th.ey disclose less in comparison to other domestic firms.

Wallace (1988) and Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) found that there was a significant
positive association between the multinational status of the companies and the level
of disclosure. The following hypothesis is proposed for MNC affiliation of Indian
companies:

H4: Fimis with multinational affiliations will have higher levels of aggregate
disclosures than domestic firms.

3.5.2

Performance-related variables

The perfonnance related variables in this study are profitability and liquidity. The
relationship between each of these characteristics and the aggregate level of
disclosure is theorised and hypothesised below.

Profitability
Profitability was used by a number of researchers as an explanatory variable for
testing the differences in disclosure levels. Researchers like Singhvi & Desai
(1971), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace & Naser (1995), Raffoumier (1995) and
Inchausti ( 1997), have found profitability to be significantly associated with
disclosure levels.

Companies having higher profitability may disclose more infonnation in their
corporate annual reports than companies with lower profitability for a number of
reasons.

If the profitability of a company is high, management may disclose more detailed
infonnation in the form of good news. If profitability is low management may
disclose less information in order to cover up losses or reasons for lower profits.
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In other words, for profitable companies if the rate of return or return on investment
is more than the industry average, the management of the company has an incentive
to communicate more infonnation which is favourable to it as the basis of a
explanation of good news. However, in a contradicting argument it can be said that
companies with high profitability may disclose less due to increased political costs
and competitive pressure (to reduce signals to potential entrants).

In this study net profit to sales is used to measure profitability. Singhvi & Desai
(1971) used this measure of profitability. The following hypothesis has been used to
test whether profitability has a significant impact on the disclosure by companies.

H5: Companies with high profitability will have higher levels of aggre.gate
disclosure of financial information.

Liquidity

The ability of the finn to meet its shrirt tenn liabilities without having to liquidate
its long tenn assets or cease operations is an important factor in the evaluation of
the finn by interested parties such as investors, lenders and regulatory authorities
(Wallace & Naser, 1995). The inability to pay off short-term liabilities means that
the finn may be unable to pay its principal amounts on loans and hence it is
detrimental to the lenders. Sometimes such a situation may lead to bankruptcy.

To reduce the speculation of investors and lenders, finns tend to disclose more
information about their ability to meet short-tenn obligations, so that the finn
remains a going concern. Belkaoui & Kahl (1978, p. 44) suggest that finns with
high liquidity ratios will have higher levels of disclosures.

Although various authors have examined liquidity in the recent years (Wallace &
Naser 1995, Owusu-Ansah 1998), a significant relationship between liquidity and
levels of disclosures has not been found. Only the study of Wallace et al. (1994)
suggests a positive relationship between liquidity and the level of disclosure. In the
Indian context however, it is a new variable that has never been examined before.
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The measurement of liquidity is best done as a ratio of current asset less stock to
current liabilities. This is also called the quick ratio or the acid test ratio. TI1e
hypothesis tested for liquidity is developed below. Due

to the inconsistency in

results in the past the nul! hypothesis has been stated below.

H6: There is no associaHun with higher levels of aggregate disclosure and finns
with higher liquidity ratios or firms with lesser liquidity ratio.

3.5.3

Market-related variables

Market-related characteristics incorporated into our study are size of the audit finn.
and capital increase.

Size of the audit firm

Several studies have empirically examined the relation between the characteristics
of audit finn [size of the audit firm (based on the number of clients) or the
international link of the auditing firm)] and the extent of disclosure. Some examples

are the studies of Singhvi (1968), Singhvi & Desai (1971), Ahmed & Nicholls
(1994), McNally et al. (1982), Hossain et al. (1994), Wallace & Naser (1995),
Raffoumier (1995) and Inchausti (1997). These researchers found positive
association between the audit finn size and level of disclosure. However, there is
also evidence that shows no significant relationship between size of the audit firm
and level of disclosure (Wallace, Naser & Mora, 1994).

It is hypothesised in this study that the companies audited by large audit firms (audit
firms with international link and large domestics finns without international links)
will have higher levels of aggregate disclosure. It can be assumed that finns that are
audited by large audit firms may disclose more due to the fear of qualification of the
audit report. If clients prepare financial reports in which disclosure is inadequate or
erroneous, larger audit firms may be more likely to report adversely on the position
of the company (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994). However it is often found that auditors
come under the pressure of accountants and accept liberal accounting policies.
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Such a situation generally arises where the audit firm is small and has a fear of
losing the client. Larger firms are more concerned with their reputation and they
generally compel companies to disclose more. Although, the primary responsibility
for preparing the annual report rests with the company, the company's auditors may
exercise some influence or provide advice regarding the levels of disclosure. The
following specific hypothesis has been tested regarding the audit firm size.

H7:

Finns that engage one of the big 5 audit finns will have higher levels of

aggregate financial disclosure.

Increase in capital
A firm raises capital by further equity issues or increases its Iong-tenn debt. A firm
may also issue capital when in distress and needs money to run its operations.
Hence when a firm tries to raise capital, users such as investors, lenders, regulators
will try to find out the reason behind further issue of equity capital or increase in
debt. In order to justify their actions finns will disclose more information than
previous years when they did not raise capital. Besides, in order to raise capital
firms disclose more information because they will have to comply with regulations
apart from establishing confidence amongst investors. Also, non-disclosure may
generate a market perception of a wrong-doing by the firm, and firms do not want to
be "lemons" in the market. Thus, they will disclose more. The hypothesis to be
tested for capital increase is as follows:
H8: Finns that have raised equity capital in the year 1999-2000 will have higher
levels of aggregate financial disclosure.
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3.6

Summary

Several hypotheses were developed in this section. Finn size, leverage, MNC
affiliation, size of the audit finn and capital increases are expected to have a
positive association with aggregate levels of disclosure by Indian companies.
Ownership diffusion, liquidity and profitability are expected to have no effect on
disclosure by Indian companies. In order to test these hypotheses a research method
is to be developed. The following chapter deals with the research method of the
study.
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CHAPTER4
RESEARCH METHOD

4.1

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to examine the finn characteristics of Indian listed
companies associated with aggregate disclosure practices. It is hypothesised that

firm size, size of the audit firm, MNC influence, leverage and capital raising will be
associated with aggregate disclosure practices of Indian listed companies, while

liquidity, ownership diffusion and profitability will have no impact on disclosure by
Indian companies. The methods used to te:;t the hypothesis, which includes
constructing the disclosure index, scoring procedures and selecting of sample of

finns, are discussed in the next section.
4.2

Measuring the extent of aggregate disclosure in company anoual
reports

Wallace and Naser (1995, p. 328) noted that there is no general theory on the items
to select for investigating the extent of disclosure. Different index systems are used
to measure level of disclosure in corporate annual report of companies by
researchers. These include unweighted index (Singhvi & Desai, 1971, Cooke 1989),
and weighted index (Buzby, 1975, Chow & Wong- Boren, 1987). The content and
the number of items in a disclosure index vary from one research study to another
and the choice of items depends on the focus of the research. One of the intentions
of this study is to measure the aggregate level of disclosure in the corporate annual
reports of Indian companies. By the term 'aggregate disclQsure' it means all those
disclosures required by the regulatory sources in India as well as any other
discretionary disclosure made by companies. In this study both an unweighted
index and a weighted index have been used. The benefits of a weighted index are
that it identifies items that possess greater usefulness and that it recognizes relative
importance of the items.
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As Marston & Shrives (1991) suggest, it is advisable to use weighted as well as

unweighted index to see the effect of weighting on the ranking of the companies.
The following section outlines the nature of index used to measure disclosure.

A search of the literature on indexes revealed that the trend is to increase the
number of items in a disclosure index. However, Marston & Robson (1997, p. 125)
noted that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that an index with many items is
superior to an index with fewer items in detecting levels of disclosure. Marston &

Robson (1997, p. 125) argued in their study that, "Barrett's (1976) index was
chosen in view of the fact that Indian financial reporting is relatively
unsophisticated and use of a more recently developed index with many disclosure
items would doubtless have resulted in many zero scores." Barrett ( 1976) had an
index with only 17 items. It was decided to select Barrett's index for this study as
Indian financial reporting is generallt acknowledged by some commentators to be
lagging behind the developed countries. Hence, it can be argued that this index can
usefully be applied to Indian financial reports.

Another reason to use Barrett's

index was to keep the number of items in the index under control. For example
Singhvi's (1968) index contained a large number of items but all items could be
categorised into broad headings, whereas Barrett's {1976) index contained only
broad headings making the index more precise. The index was examined to see
whether the items of infonnation were appropriate for the current study.

4.3

Rating the importance of aggregate disclosure items

Joshi & Abdulla (1994) state that financial analysts can be categorised as
sophisticated user group because of their ability to interpret infonnation from the
annual reports. The opinions of financial analysts are useful for measuring the
importance of disclosure items. Opinions of financial analysts are used to rate the
importance of each item in the index.
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Taking all types of users into consideration -is inappropriate for this study because
both weighted and unweighted index is considered in the study. If several user
groups were considered then a weighted index would be impracticable to use
because different users groups have preferences for different types of information.
A questionnaire was mailed to the financial analysts. The questionnaire consisted of
the items of the disclosure index. The financial analysts were asked to assign
weights to the items according to their perceptions.

Following Buzby's (1975) method, the questionnaire required the receiver to rate
each items from a scale ofO to 4, where O meant that the item is not important in the
context of disclosure in corporate annual report and 4 meant that the item was an
essential element of the annual report from the point of view of the financial
analysts. The weight for a particular item is obtained by summing the integer values
assigned to the item and then dividing that total by the number of individuals who
responded to the item. A mean was used to summarise the response scores because
it gave equal weight to each of the responses.

Similar to Buzby (1975) a rating worksheet is developed in order to measure the
extent of disclosure of the 19 items of information (17 from Barrett'a index and two
items8 that were thought to be important from the perspective of the current study)
in the sample of 55 annual reports (sample details are given in the nr,xt section)
(Appendix A). Barrett's index was adopted because Indian accountii.1g is not
complicated and use of a number of items would lead to zero scores for many items.
Two extra items that were adopted were thought to be of importance in the context
of the current study.

One worksheet is filled out for each annual report in the

sample. The worksheet consisted of a listing of the items of infmmation. It
contained two columns. One column recorded weighted score and the other
recorded unweighted score. The weighted and the unweighted index has been
discussed separately below.

8

The two additional items that were thought to be significant for the study were number of
shareholders and MNC influence.
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4.3.1

Weighted index

Items in the index are 'self contained' that means that their values are either given
or not given in the annual reports. It is not assumed that all items are applicable to
all companies. If their values are not given in the annual report, they are recorded as
'O' in the weighted index. For example, the number of stockholders are either given
in the annual reports or not given. If their values are given then the mean value of
stockholders (as described earlier) in the weighted index. Then the total weights are
added up. Then the weighted column is divided by the number of items applicable
to the particular company and multiplieO by the maximum score (i.e. 4 ). Thus the

scores of each company is calculated and recorded in the main worksheet consisting
of all companies.

4.3.2

Unweighted index

If the values of the items are not given in the annual report, they are recorded as '0'
in unweighted index. In the example given above if the number of stockholders are
given in the annual reports then they are recorded as '1' in the unweighted index.
The unweighted column is added up. The unweighted column is divided by the
number of items applicable (i.e. 19). The scores are then recorded in the main
worksheet. The main workSh~et comprised of each item of information with values
either given in the ·annual report or the presence or absence is recorded as 1 or O
respectively.

Both the indexes are analysed separately. The unweighted index is examined to see
whether the weighted disclosure index could provide any significant deviation from
the unweighted disclosure index in examining the relationship between the extent of
disclosure and various corporate attributes.
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4.4

Sample selection

The sample selection section is divided into two sub sections. The first sub section
deals with the annual report selection and the next section deals with the
questionnaire survey.

4.4.1

Annual Report Selection

The year for which the annual reports were selected is 1999-2000. There are a
number of reasons for selecting the financial year 1999-2000. Firstly, the key reason
is that the year 1999-2000 is a very important financial year. This is because,
Companies (Amendment) Act, 1999 amended Section 211 of the original
Companies Act (1956). After the amendment, Section 211 (3A) specifies that every
profit and loss account and balance sheet shall comply with the accounting
standards issued by ICAI. Therefore ICAI's accounting standards have become a
part of the requirements of the Companies Act, 1956 for companies lodging
financial statements on or after 1.4.1999. Joshi & Abdulla (1995) indicated that the
accounting standards issued by ICAI do not enjoy the enforcement by law and the
stock exchange authorities when compared to other countries. However, these
accounting standards have become mandatory under section 211 (3C) of the
Companies Act. Lastly, at the time of the study this was the most current period.

The first step in the sample selection was to select the top 150 non-financial
manufacturing and trading companies (on the basis of their market capitalisation)
listed on the Mumbai stock exchange. Barrett (1976, p. 11) noted that there are three
reasons why market capitalisation is the primary determinant of which firms would
be included in the sample. First, it is an easily obtainable figure, which, unlike some
other potential detenninants, is available for all publicly held finns. Second, it
represents a relatively unbiased measure of the firm's importance as seen by the
investing public. Finally, the criterion resulted in a sample of firms in which current
and potential equity investors were most likely to be interested.
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The sample of top 150 companies was selected from the top 500 companies listed in
the "Official Stock Exchange Directory" of the Mumbai stock exchange. The reason
1

behind selecting the top 150 finns is that they are more of interest to the investors.
They will be likely to have the maximum amount of disclosure because they are
large so they will be more in the public eye and will have the resources to publish
more infonnation.

The reason behind selecting Mumbai Stock Exchange (previously called Bombay
Stock Exchange) is that it is the largest stock exchange in India, trading with over
6,000 companies. However, there are other stock exchanges in India also, for
example, the National Stock Exchange.

The rationale for !Ising manufacturing and trading companies is to maintain
unifunnity in the sample. Financial companies have different methods of accounting
while retailing finns will be difficult to compare with manufacturing and trading
firms. So trading and manufacturing companies were selected.

The 1999-2000 annual reports were used as data sources for the purposes of the
study. All annual reports were written in English. No abridged annual reports were
included in the study. The companies selected were requested by letter to supply
their annual report for t 999-2000. In addition, The Registrars of Companies of
Mumbai and Kolkatta were requested to supply copies of the annual report of 19992000. The response rate was very poor from both the sources mentioned above
hence other agencies like the Indian Chamber of Commerce and audit firms like
MIS A.F. Ferguson were approached, to supply with the annual reports of their
clients that fanned part of the sample. Annual reports from 55 companies were
received making a 37 % response rate. Table 3 shows break up of the final sample:
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Table 3
Sample of Annual Reports
Total sample Size

Number of annual
reports

Annual reports obtained by post

43

Annual reports obtained by other sources

18

Total annual reports received

61

Unusable annual reports (abridged)

6

Final Response rate

55

Total sample Size

150

Response Rate

37%

The reason behind the poor response rate is the Indian economic and cultural

environment. The Mumbai stock market had experienced a major crash in 2000 and
thus companies seemed hesitant to give out annual report!.. This does not
necessarily mean that companies that did not give out the annual reports had
different levels of disclosure. Besides most of companies publish large number of

abridged annual reports for distribution to users. Although complete annual reports
must be published as per the Companies Act, 1956, most companies seemed to have
limited number of complete annual reports and were not interested in giving them
out.9

4.4.2

Questionnaire survey

The second step in the sample selection involved a questionnaire survey. Financial
analysts were surveyed to determine their weights of importance of financial
disclosure items. A questionnaire was surveyed amongst financial analysts of India.
The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India (IFAC) was established in
1989.

9

It is recognised that this sample selection procedure may bias the sample towards those companies with
higher disclosures.
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There are few qualified analysts in India. However there are a large number of
financial analysts (who do not hold a formal degree of IFAC), but are qualified
Chartered Accountants and work as financial analysts independently. Also financial
analysts working in Credit Rating Society of India were included in the list.
Since no unifonn population could be determined due to Jack c,f information a total
of25 financial analysts were selected from all the sources on a random basis. It was
ensured that the selection of financial analysts was well distributed. For instance,
some those wo~ as stockbrokers and others who work, as analysts of a reputable
organisation were included in the survey. The financial analysts were e-mailed with
the questic:mnafres: Seven useable replies were received making it a 25 % response
rate. Most of the ·financial analysts responded after repeated requests via e-mail.
Table 4 shows the break up ofresponse of the number of financial analysts.

Table 4
Sample of Financial Analysts
Total number of financial analysts mailed

Number of analysts

Responses from members of IF AC

O

Responses from other sources

7

Total responses received

7

Final sample

7

Total Analysts contacted

25

Response Rate

25%

4.S

Independent variables

The model of the study comprises of some independent and dependent variables. It
is hypothesized that finn size, leverage, MNC affiliation, size of the audit finn and
increase in capital wilt be associated with higher levels of aggregate disclosure by
Indian companies, while ownership diffusion, profitability and liquidity will have
no association with aggregate levels of disclosure.
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The independent variables are classified into structure related, market related and
performance related variables and they are described in brief below.
i.'

4.5.1

Structure-related Variables

Firm size
Finn size can b::: measured in a variety of ways. for example total assets, net sales,
number of employees

(structure-related characteristics) or market capitalisation

value of the firm (market-related characteristic). In this study, the market value of
the finn's equity share is considered for measuring size (Cooke 1992, OwusuAnsah, 1998, Wa1lace & Naser, 1995). This measure is more objective because
market capitalisation represents an externally determined measure of a firm's
importance as seen by the investing public (Wallace & Naser, 1995, p. 322). Barrett
(I 976, p. 11 ), indicated the reasons why market capitalisation can be used are

firstly, it is an easily obtainable figure, which unlike some other potential
detenninants, are available for all publicly held finns. Secondly, it represents a
relatively unbiased measure of firm's importance as seen by the investing public.
Thus, market capitalisation was thought to be the most appropriate measure for firm
size in this study.

Leverage
Debt-equity ratio can be measured in a variety of ways. For instance, book value of
debt to shareholder's equity or book value of debt to total assets (Chow & WongBoren, 1987, Wallace. Naser & Mora, 1994). In this study leverage is measured by
total liabilities over total assets.
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Ownenhip Diffusion

As ownership diffusion is a measure of how widely the shares of the firms are held.
It is measured by the number of shareholders other than the top 20 shareholders of

the firm that is companies with widely held shares as compared to companies with
closely held shares (Owusu-Ansah 1998, Raffoumier 1995, Wallace & Naser 1995).
Researchers in the past have acknowledged that the number of shareholders is also
another proxy for firm size. For corporations with large number of shareholders
tend to be more in the public eye and therefore more under the pressure of
regulatory bodies and other users of financial statements (like financial analysts,
investors, and creditors) for improved aggregate levels of disclosure. Due to the
multicollinearity problem between finn size and ownership distribution the measure
of firm size has been taken as market capitalisation and measure of ownership
distribution has been taken as number of stockholders in the firm other than the top
20 shareholders. In this study ownership distribution is measured by the number of
shareholders other than the top 20 shareholders of the finn that is companies with
widely held shares as compared to companies with closely held shares (OwusuAnsah 1998, Raffoumier 1995, Wallace & Naser 1995). Doe to instances from the
studies of Singhvi & Desai (1971) and Hossain et al. (1994) it is expected that no
relationship between ownership diffusion would be found

Multinational Company (MNC) Affiliation
In order to determine that finns had multinational influence, each annual report was
examined to determine whether they were subsidiaries of multinational parents or
they had participation of foreign management (whether the Board of directors
consisted of foreign m;.tionals).
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4.5.2

Performance-related variables

Profitability

Researchers have used a number of profit related measures in their studies, such as
net profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend growth and dividend stability, rate of
return and earnings margin. In this study net profit to sales have been used to
measure profitability.

Liquidity
Wallace & Naser (1995), and Owusu-Ansah (1998), and other authors examined
liquidity in their study. Their measurement of liquidity was a ratio of current asset
less stock to current liabilities. This ratio of liquidity is also called an acid-test ratio
or quick ratio. This ratio has been used in the study.

4.5.3

Market-Related Variables

Size of the audit firm

At the time of the study there were 5 major audit finns (MIS A. F, Ferguson & Co.,
Lovelock Lewis, Price Waterhouse, Batliboy and Arthur Anderson). These finns
have major multinational and national companies as their clients and are regarded as
large firms in the Indian market. Some of the firms have affiliations with large
Indian audit finns. In this study firms are considered to have been audited by large
firms if they are audited by one of them. This measure is consistent with other

studies like (Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994, Wallace et al, 1994, Singhvi & Desai, 1971).
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Increase in capital

The capital structure for all the sample firms was examined for the year 1999-2000
and 1998-1999. Both these balances for capital were available from 1999-2000
annual reports. If the equity capital increased during the year of study then the firm
was given a score of I and otherwise it was given a score of 0.

4.6

Summary

This chapter dealt with the research methodology. It included the sample selection
process, the definitions of the dependent and independent variable, the data sources
used and the various aspects of the research design of the study. In the following
chapter, the results of the data analysis are reported.
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CHAPTERS
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

S.1

Introduction

Previous studies on Indian companies conducted bivariate and univariate analyses
on the sample data. However following the trend of Marston and Robson (1997)

and other disclosure studies, two multivariate models are developed for this study.
As mentioned in chapter 2, multivariate models are better than bivariate and
univariate models when more than one independent variable is involved in the
analysis. Descriptive statistics are also conducted in the study. All relevant data

needed frum the Indian company reports and responses from the financial analysts
were successfully collected. The statistical analyses were performed using the
statistical software package .. SPSS" (11.0 version). The results of these analyses
will ascertain whether the hypotheses set out could be accepted or rejected. Prior to
descriptive statistics and the development of the multivariate models, the procedure
for weighting the aggregate disclosure items is given below.

5.2

Rating the importance of aggregate disclosure items

In the financial analysts' questionnaire survey the weights that were assigned to all
the items of disclosure were added up.

The weight for a particular item was

obtained by summing the integer values assigned to the item and then dividing that
total by the number of individuals who responded to the item. A mean for each item
was used to summarise the response scores because it gave equal weight to each of
the responses for a particular item. The sum of all 19 weights equalled 62.75. There
were all positive responses in the questionnaire. Table 5 shows the items of
information and the mean scores allocated to each item.
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Table 5
Weighted Mean scores of the aggregate disclosure items

Items of Information

Weighted

Maximum

Minimum

Mean scores

score

Score

1. Financial history

3.75

4

3

2. Segment reporting: Product line

3.0

4

I

3. Segment reporting: Geographical area

2.25

3

I

4. Capital expenditure: Current

3.5

4

2

5. Capital expenditure: Planned

3.5

4

3

6. Depreciation method

3.75

4

3

7.Cash flow statement

3.75

4

3

8. Retained earnings

3.75

4

3

9. Fixed asset composition

3.0

4

2

10. Inventory composition

3.25

4

2

11. Price-level adjusted statement

2.0

3

1

12. Market value of marketable securities

3.5

4

3

13. Currency translation method

3.0

4

I

14. Depreciation life

3.5

4

2

15. Foreign exchange gains

3.5

4

3

16. Sales and gross margin

3.75

4

3

17. Income tax disclosure

3.5

4

3

18. Number of stockholders

2.75

3

2

19. Type of management

3.75

4

3

Total

62.75

The weighted mean scores are the averages of all the scores given by 7 financial
analysts. The maximum scores and the minimum scores indicate the maximum and
minimum possible weight obtained for each item in the index. The total weight
indicates the sum of all weighted mean scores.
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5.3

Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics for the sample of 57 Indian companies is provided in Table
6. The variables described in column 1 of Table 6 are finn size (SIZE); liquidity
(DEBT); ownership diffusion (OUTSH); profitability (PROF); liquidity (LIQR);
multinational company affiliation (MNC); size of the audit firm (AUD) and capital
increase. The two other dependent variables are unweighted disclosure (DISC) and
weighted disclosure (WDISC). Data in columns 2 and 3 are the mean and standard
deviations of the variables. The maximum and minimum scores and pf the variables
are given in columns 4 and 5.

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics (N = 57)
Variable

Mean

Standard

Maximum

Minimum

(I)

(2)

Deviation

(4)

(5)

(3)
DISC

0.78

0.1 I

1.00

0.50

WDISC

0.67

0.092

0.84

0.43

SIZE (Rs. 000,000)•

5,691

I0,719

49513.0

3.75

LOG SIZE

6.960

2.39

IO.Bl

1.32

DEBT

3.90

6.55

34.37

0

OUTSH

34.20

37.23

97.17

0

PROF

-I .31

14.13

-!03.61

17.34

LIQR

1.88

2.27

12

0.06

Frequency

%

Frequency

%

(I)

(0)

MNC

20

35

37

65

AUD

24

42

33

58

CAPR

17

30

40

70

*

The figures are in millions of rupees.

•

With the exception of LOGSIZE all continuous variables were nonnally
distributed.
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The mean disclosure score for the unweighted disclosure index is 0. 78, which
·means the average disclosure score is 78 % of the total items in the disclosure index.
The result can be compared with that of Marston and Robson (1997) whose mean
disclosure score was found to be between 59%-69% for two periods. The mean
disclosure score for weighted disclosure index is 0.67, which means the average
disclosure score is 67% of the total items in the disclosure index.
The sample also includes 35% of companies with a multinational affiliation, 30% of
companies that raised capital in 1999-2000 and 42% of companies audited by a Big

5 audit finn.
Tables 7 and 8 indicate the disclosure frequency for the weighted and unweighted
index respectively. The minimum score in the unweighted index was 0.50 and the
maximum score was 1, and the results in Table 6 indicated that most companies had
a disclosure score between 0.70 and 0.90. Table 7 indicates the maximum (0.84)
and the minimum (0.43) score of the unweighted index. In this case however it was
found that maximum companies had a disclosure score between 0.43 and 0. 70.

Table 7
Disclosure Frequency (unweighted index)
Frequency

Cumulative Percentage

0.50-0.70

11

19.3

0.71-0.90

39

91.2

0.91-1.0

5

100

Score

10

Table 8

Disclosure Freguency (weighted index)

Frequency

Cumulative Percentage

0.43-0.70

38

66.7

0.71-0.84

19

100

Score

To examine the correlation between the dependent and independent variables,

Pearson's correlation coefficients ® were computed in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9

indicates the Pearson's correlation matrix of unweighted disclosure index and firm
characteristics. Prior studies on disclosure have used Pearson's Correlation (Ahmed
& Nicholl~ 1994, Inchausti. 1997, Wallace & Naser, 1995).

Table 9

Association of unweighted disclosures with !inn characteristics {Pearson's

Correlation Matrix)
DISC

SIZE

DEBT

SIZE

0.176

1

DEBT

-0.188

0.006

1

OUTSH

MNC

LIQR

AUD

0.083

-0.297

I

0.118

0.121

-0.168

PROF

OUTSH

0.355*

-0.207

-0.020

MNC

0.072

0.205

-0.278*

0.128

1

PROF

0.355**

0.067

0.009

0.145

0.118

1

-0.158

0.124

LIQR

-0.109

-0.139

-0.075

-0.103

AUD

0.030

0.227

-0.224

-0.099

CAPR

0.256

0.109

0.080

0.056

0.490*
-0.078

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed).
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The results of Table 9 indicate that there is a significant correlation between outside
shareholders and profitability with the level of disclosure. In other words, the
coefficient of correlation between the unweighted disclosure index and number of
shareholders other than the top 20 shareholders and also the ratio of net profit to
sales is higher than any other variables.

Significant correlations between independent variables constitute a potential
problem for the use of multiple regression analysis. The correlation matrix identifies
a significant negative correlation between multinational affiliation and debt and a
positive correlation between multinational association and Big 5 auditor. There is
also a significant negative correlation between Big 5 auditor and the liquidity ratio.
However, these correlations are below the suggested limits (0.9 and above) and
should not cause a problem with multicollinearity in regression analysis (Hair,
Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1984).

To see if there is any association between weighted disclosure index and the firm
specific characteristics in the study another correlation matrix was develope..... The
results are indicated in Table 10.
Table 10

Association of weighted disclosures with finn characteristics (Pearson's Correlation
Matrix}

WDISC
SIZE

SIZE

DEBT

OUT SH

MNC

PROF

LIQR

AUD

0.170

DEBT

-0.210

0.006 ·

1

OUTSH

0.302*

-0.207

-0.020

1

MNC

0.092

0.205

-0.278*

0.\28

1

PROF

0.356**

0.067

0.009

0.145

0.118

LIQR

-0.110

-0.139

-0.075

-0.103

-0.158

0.124

1

AUD

0.072

0.227

-0.224

-0.099

0.490*

0.083

-0.297

CAPR

0.256

0.109

0.080

0.056

-0.078

0.118

0.121

-0.168

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).

•

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) .
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The results of Table 10 are similar to that of Table 9. There is a significant
correlation between outside shareholders and profitability with the level of
disclosure. A negative relationship is observed between multinational affiliation and
debt and a positive correlation between multinational affiliation and Big 5 auditor.

5.4

Multivariate models

Multiple linear regression techniques are used to test two alternative versions fur
each hypothesis. The two multivariate models (one using unweighted index and
other using weighted index) used to examine the association between firm specific
characteristics and financial disclosure are given below.

5.4.1

Model I

DISC -f (SIZE+ DEBT+OUTSH+MNC+PROF+LIQR+AUD+CAPR) + C
Where:

DISC= Unweighted disclosure index

SIZE= Market capitalisation of the company

DEBT= Debt to equity ratio

OUTSH = Number of shareholders other than the top 20 shareholders

MNC = Multinational company influence (1, O)

PROF = Net profit to sales ratio

LIQR = Ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities

AUD= 8'g 5 audit firm
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CAPR = Raised capital in 1999/2000 (1, 0)

€=Error Tenn
5.4.2

Model 2

WDISC =f(SIZE + DEBT+OUTSH+MNC+PROF+LIQR+AUD+CAPR) + €

Where:

WDISC = Weighted disclosure index

SIZE= Market capitalisation of the company

DEBT"" Debt to equity ratio
OUTSH = Number of shareholders other than the top 20 shareholders

MNC = Multinational company influence (1, 0)

PROF= Net profit to sales ratio
LIQR = Ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities

AUD = Big 5 audit finn
CAPR =Raised capital in 1999/2000 (I, 0)

€

=

Error Tenn
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5.5

Multivariate Analysis

5.5.1

Unweighted Index

In order to analyse the manner, in which the firm specific variables were associated
with the unweighted disclosure index, an ordinary least square regression equation
based on Model 1 was estimated. Following Marston & Robson (1997), prior to the
estimation, the sh:.e variable was transfonned (logarithm) because it is expected that
there will be a non-linear association between finn size and level of disclosure. As
mentioned earlier, the multicollinearity problem has been eliminated because of the
measures adopted for firm size and ownership The regression results are set out in
Table 11:
Table 11
Association between unweighted disclosure index and firm characteristics (ordinary
least §guare regression}.
Variable

Predicted

Coefficient

t

Probability

12.997

0.000

sign
INTERCEPT
LNSIZE

+

0.294

2.228

0.031•

DEBT

?

0.173

1.430

0.159**

OUT SH

+

0.220

1.800

0.078*

MNC

+

.0.41

-0.296

0.768*

PROF

+

0.242

1.927

0.060*

LIQR

?

-0.115

-0.923

0.361 **

AUD

+

0.023

0.163

0.871 *

CAPR

+

0.192

1.573

0.122*

N

57

F

3.486

Pr>F

0.001

Adjusted R

2

0.262

* One tailed test
** Two tailed test
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The above regression model (Model 1) was able to explain 26 % of the variation in
disclosure scores. Company size was found to be a significant variable. However,
when the size variable was analysed independ1..,'f1tly, R square was 0.2 % indicating
20% variation in disclosure. This result can be compared with Marston & Robson
( 1997)

10

who found 30% variation in disclosure scores. All other variables that are

marginally significant include outside shareholders (p = 0.07) and profitability (p =
0.060). Leverage, size of the audit firm, capital increase, MNC influence not found
to be, significantly associated with disclosure.

As predicted liquidity had no

association with disclosure.

5.5.2

Weighted Index

To examine the firm specific variables were associated with the weighted disclosure
index, an ordinary least square regression equation based on Model 2 was estimated.
Herc also, prior to the estimation the size variable was transformed because it is
expected that there will be a non-linear association between firm size and level of
disclosure. The regression results are set out in Table 12.

10

Marslof'! & Robson (1997) only considered firm size as an independent variable.
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Table 12

Association between weighted disclosure index and finn characteristics (ordinary

least square regression).
Variable

Predicted sign

Coefficient

INTERCEPT

I

Probability

13.014

0.000

LNSlZE

+

0.284

2.134

0.038•

DEBT

?

0.177

1.454

0.152••

OUTSH

+

0.192

1.557

0.126•

MNC

+

.0.032

.0.229

0.820•

PROF

+

0.244

1.921

0.061•

LIQR

?

.0.109

.0.863

0.393••

AUD

+

0.065

0.447

0.657•

CAPR

+

0.205

1.658

0.104•

N

57

F

3.290

Pr>F

0.001

Adjusted R2

0.246

• One tailed test

** Two tailed test
***See Footnote 11

The above regression model (Model 2) was able to explain 24 % of the variation in

disclosure scores. Company size is a significant variable (p == 0.038). Profitability (p
=

0.061) and capital increase (p = 0.104) are also found to be marginally significant.

11
Descriptive datu indicated that debt and profitability could be influenced by some extreme values.
Regression teKlll were run without these outlieni. Results were com1istent with those reported in tables
10&11.
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The results of the weighted index can be compared to the study of Singhvi ( 1968).
He found size, and ownership diffusion to be significantly associated with
disclosure. Similar result~ are found in this study. Singhvi's (1968) study did not
find profitability to be significantly associated with disclosure whereas this study
found profitability to be associated with disclosure. Both studies found that audit
finn size is not associated with disclosure.

5.6

Conclusion

This study has analysed the results of multiple regression to test the association
between company characteristics and extent of disclosure in Indian company annual
reports. The extent of disclosure was measured using both weighted and unweighted
indexes. The regression results indicated that disclosure is positively associated with
finn size, ownership diffusion, profitability and capital increase (marginal).
Ownership diffusion, which was hypothesised to have no relationship with
disclosure, was found to have positive relationship with disclosure. This maybe due
to the reason that the Indian investors are becoming more conscious and thus
putting pressure on companies to disclose more. In this study it was expected that
1:he use of weights would improve the explanatory power of the models. However,
no major differences were noted between the results from weighted and unweighted
disclosure index. Both Model 1 and Model 2 have indicated similar results. It can be
concluded that two companies disclosing 19 different types of infonnation would
have the same levels of disclosure under the weighted and unweighted model. It is
to be noted here that both weighted and unweighted models produce similar results
in tenns of the significant and insignificant variables.

The theoretical framework of the study was based on agency theory and capital
raising theory. It was expected that managers of the firms will disclose infonnation
to reduce agency costs and also while they raise capital. Since the results indicated
finn size, ownership diffusion and profitability are significant, it can be said that the
theories have been confinned. Finn with large market capitalisation, firms with
large number of shareholders, large net profit to sales ratio and finns that try to raise
capital will influence disclosure more than others.
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It was found while examining the annual reports for disclosure items that all

accounting standards applicable to the companies were applied. Thus, it can be said
that regulation of the accounting standards issued by !CAI had increased the level of
disclosure. However the extent of increase in disclosure was not in the scope of the

study.
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CHAPTER 6
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

6.1

Introduction

The objective of the study was to examine the finn characteristics associated with

disclosure practices of Indian companies. It is hypothesised that firm size, audit firm
size, leverage, capital increase and MNC influence will be positively associated

with disclosure while ownership diffusion, liquidity and profitability will have no
effect on disclosure. Whilst trying to achieve the objectives of the study every effort

has bet>- ·~ken to ensure that this is a thorough study. However, similar to all
studies ·-·

6.2

: are certain limitations to it

Implications

The implications of this study are varied. Firstly, it is useful for the investors to
ascertain which types of companies disclose more than others. Also investors can
examine the opinions and weights given by financial analysts and evaluate their
decision~making processes. The study also has great implications for regulators who
could ascertain if regulation can play an important role in increased disclosure by
companies or there is no necessity for further reg1.1lation.

6.3

Limitations

The major limitation of the study is the sample size of annual reports. Although in
comparison to past studies on India the sample size can be considered reasonable 12
but in comparison to studies on disclosure practices of other countries, the sample
size is relatively small. A larger sample can be useful for the stability of the
regression equation.
12

Marston & Robson, (1997) used 29 pairs of annunl reports for two accounting periods and
Singhvi (1968) used 45 annual reports.
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The limited number of responses from the financial analysts can also be regarded as
a limitation. Although the Institute of chartered financial analysts was requested
with letters to provide for a list of financial analysts, no response was received from
them. The weights were determined as per the opinion of only seven analysts. The
study could have produced stronger results if more analysts would have responded.

Another potential limitation of the study is the measurement of the variables. While
each of the variables could be tested in a number of ways one can argue that one
particular measurement is not enough for a variable. For inst®ce, market
capitalisation was used to test finn size. It can be argued that market capitalisation
is a rare method of measuring finn size and the more common measurements are
total assets, sales and total shareholders (McNally et al. 1982, Chow & Wong
Boren, 1987).

While the financial year 1999-2000 has been considered very important to the
study, this can be a possible limitation to the study. Although the accounting
standards gained legal recognition during 1999-2000 one can argue that the
companies were not given enough time to adopt the mandatory standards. It might
be seen that those companies that particularly had fewer amounts of disclosures in
1999-2000 could have adopted the standards in the subsequent years thereby
increasing their overall disclosure levels.

6.4

Recommendations for Future Research

As mentioned in the limitation section, the study considers the annual report 19992000. Future research can be conducted to measure the extent of disclosure
longitudinally to detennine whether the extent of disclosure has been improved over
time. Research can also be conducted on disclosure by firms of a particular industry
to see whether finn characteristics influence the disclosure practices of the firms in
the industry.
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Another area of future research is a similar study with a larger number of items in
index. The number of items in the disclosure index is limited to 19 in this study
because Indian accounting is relatively unsophisticated and inclusion of more items
would have lead to a number of items being not applicable. However, it has to be
borne in mind that Indian accounting environment is changing in a very fast pace
and so in future research more items can be included. Also, instead of measuring
aggregate disclosure, future studies can be conducted on mandatory and voluntary
disclosures separately. Also, instead of using financial analysts, opinions of other
groups of users could also be used to ascertain weights for disclosure information.

Also, as mentioned in the limitation section, the independent variables can be
measured in different ways in future. For example, finn size can be measured by the
number of employees, total sales, total assets or other values instead of market
capitalisation. A number of other independent variables can be examined like listing
status, industry type, and qualification of the audit report.

Finally, this study can be replicated in other countries especiaily in countries that
have similar accounting practices, cultural and economic background like India.
This is because several countries were a colony of Britain for a long period of time
and their accounting practices are based on British Companies Act just like India.
Findings of such similar studies will ascertain if countries with similar accounting
practices have similar firm characteristics influencing disclosure.

82

REFERENCES
Ahmed. K., & Nicholls, D. (1994). The impact of non-financial company
characteristics on mandatory disclosure compliance in developing countries: The

case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting, 29, 62-77.
Ahmed, K. (1996). Disclosure policy choice and corporate characteristics: A study
of Bangladesh. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting, 3(1 ), 183-203.

Barrett, M. (1976). Financial reporting: Disclosure and comprehensiveness in an

international setting. Journal of Accounting Research, Spring, 10-26.
Belkaoui, A., & Kahl, A. ( 1978). Corporate fir:ancial disclosure in Canada.

Research Monograph, No. 1, Vancouver: Canadian Certified General Accountants
Association.
Buzby, S. L. (1975). Company size, listed versus unlisted stocks, and the extent of
financial disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research,13(1 ), 16-37.

Cerf, A. R. (1961). Comorate Reporting and Investment Decision. Berkeley,
California, University of California Printing Department.

Chow, C.W., &

Wong-Boren.

(1987). Voluntary disclosure by Mexican

corporations. The Accounting Review, 63(3), 533-541.

Cooke, T. E. (1989). Disclosure in the corporate annual reports of Swedish
companies. Accounting and Business Research, 19(74), 113-124.

83

Cooke, T. E. (1991). An assessment of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of
Japanese corporations. The International Journal of Accounting, 26,174-189.

Cooke, T. E. ( 1992). The impact of size, stock market listing and industry type on
disclosure in the annual reports of Japanese listed corporations. Accounting and
Business Research, 22(87), 229-237.

Cooke, T., E. (1993). Disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports. Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting. 20(4), 521-535.

Davies, R., & Kelly, G. (1979). The quality of annual report disclosure in Australia
and its relationship to corporate size. Management Forum, 4-5, 259-273.

Gupta, M., Saxena, P., & Kaushik, S. P. (2002). A study of accounting practices in
Indian private sector. Research Bulletin, XXI, 59-71.

Hair, J. F. Jr., Anderson R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1984). Multivariate
data analysis with readin.gL(41h ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Infonnation asymmetry, corporate disclosure,
and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 31, 405-440.

Hossain, M. T. L. M., & Adams, M. (1994). Voluntary disclosure in an emerging
capital market: Some empirical evi~ence from companies listed on the Kuala
Lumpur stock exchange. The International Journal of Accounting, 29, 334-351.

Imhoff, E. A. (1992). The relation between perceived accounting quality and
economic characteristics of the fi.nn. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 11,
97-118.

84

Inchausti, B. G. (1997). The influence of company characteristics and accounting
regulation on infonnation disclosed by Spanish finns. The European Accounting
Review, 6(1 ), 45-68.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Management
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,

1Ql, 305-360.

Joshi, P. L., & Abdulla, J. (1994). An investigation into the infonnation
requirements of Indian private investors within annual reports. Accounting &
Finance, July-September, 5-21.

Joshi, P. L., & Abdulla, J. (1995). Accounting standards and corporate financial
reporting in India. Asian Review of Accounting, September, 105-124.

Marston, C., & Robson, P. (1997). Financial reporting in India: Changes in
disclosure over the period 1982 to 1990. Asia-Pacific Journal Of Accounting. June,
109-137.
Marston, C., & Shrives, P. J. (1991). The use of disclosure indices in accounting
research. A review article. British Accoupting Review, 23, 195-210.

McNally, G. M., Eng, L. H., & Hasseldine, C. R. (1982). Corporate financial
reporting in New Zealand: An analysis of user preferences, corporate characteristics
and disclosure practices for discretionary infonnation. Accounting and Business
Research, Winter, 11-20.

Ngurah, A., P., S. (1996). Corporate Financial Reporting in Indonesia: An Analysis
of Corporate Characteristics and Information disclosure practices. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Curtin University of Technology, Perth. (University Microfilm
No. MF 657.09598 NGU).

85

Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998). The impact of corporate attributes on the extent of
mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe. The
International Journal of Accounting, 33(5), 605-631.

Patton, J. & Zelenka, I. (1997). An empirical analysis of the detenninants of the
extent of disclosure in annual reports of joint stock compani~ in the Czech
Republic. The European Accounting Review, 6(4), 605-626.

Raffoumier, B. (1995). The detenninants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss
listed companies. The European Accounting Review, 4(2), 261-280.

Singhvi, S. S. & Desai, H., B. (1971). An empirical analysis of the quality of
corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review, 3(2), 129-138.

Singhvi, S. S. (1968). Characteristics and implications of inadequate disclosure: A
case study of India. The International Journal of Accounting, 46(l} 29-43.

Tai, B. Y. K., Au-Yeung, P., Kwok, M. C. M., & Lau, L. W. C. (1990). Noncompliance with disclosure requirements in financial statements: The case of Hong
Kong companies. The International Journal of Accounting, 25, 99-112.

Tong, L. T., Kidman, Z. A., & Cheong P. W. (1990). Infonnation needs of users
and voluntary disclosure practices of Malaysian listed corporations, Malaysian
Accountant, April, 2-6.

Wallace, R. S. 0., & Naser, K. (1995). Finn specific determinants of the
comprehensiveness of mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms
listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong, Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy. 14. 311-368.

Wallace, R. S. O. (1988). Corporate financial reporting in Nigeria. Accounting and
Business Research, 18(72), 352-362.

86

Wallace, R. S. 0., Naser, K., & Mora, A (1994). The relationship between the
comprehensiveness of corporate annual reports and finn characteristics in Spain.
Accounting and Business Research, 25{97), 41-53.
Watts, R., & Zimmennan, J. L. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the
detennination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 63{1), 1124-134.

87

APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
Kind1y rate the following !tern:. of information in tenns of disclosure by companies in the
annual report. Please circle the appropriate numbers.
Not
imE:ortant
1

Oflittie
imeortance
2

Important
3

Very
imEortant
4

1

2

3

4

3. Segment reporting: Geographical area

2

3

4

4. Capital Expenditure: Current

2

3

4

5. Capital expenditure: Planned

2

3

4

6. Depreciation method

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

10. Inventory composition

2

3

4

1 t. Price-level adjusted statement

2

3

4

12. Market value of marketable securities

2

3

4

13. Currency translation method

2

3

4

14. Depreciation life

2

3

4

15. Foreign exchange gains

2

3

4

16. Sales and gross margin

2

3

4

2

3

4

18. Number of stockholders

2

3

4

19. TYPe of management (MNC influence)

2

3

4

Items of information
1. Financial history
2. Segment reporting: Product line

7. Cash flow statement

1

8. Retained earnings statement

9. Fixed asset composition

17. Income iax disclosure

1

1

Thanks for talcing out time to fill up this questionnaire.
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APPENDIX B
List of sample companies used in the study

Name of the companies
I. ABB

2. AMI Computers India Ltd

3. Bajaj Auto Ltd
4. Bata
5. Beeyu Overseas Ltd
6. Bharat Heavy Electricals
7. BPL Ltd
8. BSES
9. BTW Industries

I 0. Cadburys
11. Castrol India

12. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd
13. Ciba

14. Coal India

15. Colagte Palmolive
16. Essar Steel Ltd

17. Glaxco India Ltd
18. Global Telesystems
19. Godfrey Philips
20. Godrej India
21. Good Year

22. Grasim Industries Ltd
23. Gujarat Ambuja Cement

24. Gujarat Industries Power Co Ltd
25. Hindustan Antibiotics

26. Hindustan Lever Ltd
27. Hindustan Photo Films
28.HLCL
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APPENDIX 8 (CONTD)

29. lnfar

30. !spat Industries Ltd
29. ITC Ltd

30. Kale Consultants
31. Kodak India
32. L&T
33. Max India

34. McDowell
35. National Fertilizers Ltd
36. Nestle

37. Ninna

38. Reckitt & Colman India
39. Reliance Industires Ltd
40. Rica Sugar Co. Ltd
41. Rolta India
42. Satyam
43. SE Asia Marine

44. Siemens
45. Steel Authority of India
46. Tata Electric
47. Tata Elxsi
48. Tata Engineering
49. Tata Libert
50. Tata Metaliks
51. Tata Steel
52. Tata Tea
53. The Morarjec Gogculdas
54. WIPRO

55. Yarn Syndicate Ltd
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